Skills/PyPI/parts-mcp

parts-mcp@0.5.3

CAUTION· not started

Publisher claims: "Model Context Protocol (MCP) server for electronic parts sourcing with KiCad integration" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher sourceparts · publishing for 279 daysInstalls 194Last detonated 4 h ago
What would fix thisWatchDispute verdict

Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
AUTHOR_EMAILAUTHOR_NAMEGITHUB_API_KEYMCP_ACCESS_TOKEN_TTLMCP_JWT_RSA_PRIVATE_KEYSOURCE_PARTS_API_KEYConfiguration, not credentials: BRANCH, CACHE_EXPIRY_HOURS, COMMIT_MESSAGE, COMMIT_SHA, COMMIT_URL, DEFAULT_PAGE_SIZE, KICAD_CLI_PATH, KICAD_SEARCH_PATHS, MAX_RESULTS, MCP_HOST, MCP_PATH, MCP_PORT, MCP_REDIS_URL, MCP_STORAGE_DIR, MCP_TRANSPORT, PARTS_CACHE_DIR, PARTS_CLI_PATH, PARTS_LANDING_URL, PARTS_USER_ROLE, ProgramFiles, REPOSITORY, SEARCH_TIMEOUT, SERVICE_EMOJI, SERVICE_NAME, SOURCE_PARTS_API_URL, TIMESTAMP
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso source.parts, claude.ai — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names source.parts, claude.ai as well as its own vendor. The guard injects AUTHOR_EMAIL, AUTHOR_NAME, GITHUB_API_KEY, MCP_ACCESS_TOKEN_TTL, MCP_JWT_RSA_PRIVATE_KEY, SOURCE_PARTS_API_KEY only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx parts-mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-14 and scored it 79/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedparts_mcp/tools/kicad_ctrl.py:391 · Python subprocess execution detectedproc = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionparts_mcp/tools/cli.py:121 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesparts bom pdf [bom.csv] [-b "Board Name"] [-o output.pdf] [--prefix "Board_V1.03"]Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedparts_mcp/utils/kicad_utils.py:347 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, text=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsmain.py:17 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"""Load environment variables from .env file if it exists."""Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandDockerfile:24 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionschown mcp:mcp /tmp/parts-mcp-cacheFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsmain.py:25 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system fileslogging.warning("python-dotenv not installed, skipping .env file")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedparts_mcp/tools/cli.py:348 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsmain.py:18 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesenv_file = project_dir / ".env"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsmain.py:33 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system fileslogging.info("Loaded environment variables from .env file")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedparts_mcp/utils/kicad_utils.py:338 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(cmd, shell=True, capture_output=True, text=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedparts_mcp/utils/kicad_utils.py:289 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/verify_attribute_guard.py:28 · Python subprocess execution detectedsrc = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionscripts/send-commit-notification.ts:56 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log(`${data.service_emoji} Sending ${data.service_name} commit notification...`);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedparts_mcp/utils/kicad_utils.py:458 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedparts_mcp/utils/kicad_utils.py:371 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈57 tok
1 file · 81 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for parts-mcp@0.5.3 as of 4 h ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.

What would make this Verified

1 point to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim sourceparts: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  3. Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  4. File type combined with upload action≈ +2 on the totalRemove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
  5. File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
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