paper-download-mcp@0.9.2
VERIFIED· not startedPublisher claims: "MCP server for downloading academic papers from multiple sources" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.- Tested
- the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
CORE_API_KEYOPENALEX_API_KEYConfiguration, not credentials: SCIHUB_AUTO_TUNING_PATH, SCIHUB_CLI_EMAIL, SCIHUB_ENABLE_ROUTING, SCIHUB_OUTPUT_DIR, SCIHUB_PARALLEL, SCIHUB_RETRIES, SCIHUB_TIMEOUT, SCIHUB_YEAR_THRESHOLD- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the codeAlso europepmc.org, doi.org, crossref.org, wiley.com, tandfonline.com, ssrn.com, arxiv.org, ebi.ac.uk, sci-hub.mk, sci-hub.ren, sci-hub.vg, sci-hub.ee, sciencedirect.com, nature.com, springer.com, sagepub.com, mdpi.com, harvard.edu, base-search.net, core.ac.uk, jina.ai, openaire.eu, openalex.org, osti.gov, nih.gov, semanticscholar.org, unpaywall.org — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names europepmc.org, doi.org, crossref.org, wiley.com, tandfonline.com, ssrn.com, arxiv.org, ebi.ac.uk, sci-hub.mk, sci-hub.ren, sci-hub.vg, sci-hub.ee, sciencedirect.com, nature.com, springer.com, sagepub.com, mdpi.com, harvard.edu, base-search.net, core.ac.uk, jina.ai, openaire.eu, openalex.org, osti.gov, nih.gov, semanticscholar.org, unpaywall.org as well as its own vendor. The guard injects CORE_API_KEY, OPENALEX_API_KEY only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-14 and scored it 93/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
No findings across 13,277 lines in 77 files.
Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for paper-download-mcp@0.9.2 as of 4 h ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.