Skills/PyPI/pal-mcp-server-ramarivera

pal-mcp-server-ramarivera@9.8.2

CAUTION· not started

Publisher claims: "AI-powered MCP server with multiple model providers" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher ramarivera · publishing for 252 daysInstalls 57Last detonated 5 h ago
What would fix thisWatchDispute verdict

Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
no credential variables read in the code
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso dialx.ai, x.ai, pyenv.run, pypa.io, claude.ai, githubusercontent.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it under the guard. Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed. The code names no credential variable; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx pal-mcp-server-ramarivera

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-14 and scored it 70/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths; Pipe-to-shell pattern. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.2sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsAGENTS.md:16 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files- `./run-server.sh` – install dependencies, refresh `.env`, and launch the MCP server locally.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsAGENTS.md:102 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files…atforms. ## Security & Configuration Tips Store API keys and provider URLs in `.env` or your MCP client config; never commit secrets or generated log artifacts. Us…Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
CRITICAL
Pipe-to-shell patternrun-server.sh:1236 · Pipe-to-shell pattern — downloads and immediately executes remote code# - curl https://claude.ai/install.sh | bash -> ~/.local/bin/claudeFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST06
CRITICAL
Pipe-to-shell patternrun-server.sh:342 · Pipe-to-shell pattern — downloads and immediately executes remote codeecho " curl https://pyenv.run | bash" >&2Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST06
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_utils.py:35 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filescontent, tokens = read_file_content("/etc/passwd")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionconfig.py:103 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files# - prompt.txt file content (alternative user input method)Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsutils/env.py:17 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files_ENV_PATH = _PROJECT_ROOT / ".env"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsCLAUDE.md:46 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files- Create/update .env fileFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsrun-server.sh:1055 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesif [[ -f .env ]]; thenFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsutils/env.py:36 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"""Reload .env values and recompute override semantics.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/conftest.py:28 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# Ensure tests operate with runtime environment rather than .env overrides during importsFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsCLAUDE.md:318 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files- Proper API keys configured in `.env` fileFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandrun-server.sh:435 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegesecho "sudo apt update && sudo apt install -y python3-venv python3-pip"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Direct script execution from GitHub raw URLtools/version.py:93 · Direct script execution from GitHub raw URL — unverified code sourcegithub_url = "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/ramarivera/pal-mcp-server/main/config.py"Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsutils/env.py:61 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"""Return True when PAL_MCP_FORCE_ENV_OVERRIDE is enabled via the .env file."""Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsutils/file_types.py:56 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files".env", # EnvironmentFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandrun-server.sh:433 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegesecho "sudo apt update && (sudo apt install -y python${version_suffix}-venv python${version_suffix}-dev || sudo apt install -y python3-venv python3-pip)"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsserver.py:157 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system fileslogger.info("PAL_MCP_FORCE_ENV_OVERRIDE enabled - .env file values will override system environment variables")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsrun-server.sh:1053 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# Setup .env fileFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Remote installer piped to shellrun-server.sh:1236 · Remote installer piped to shell# - curl https://claude.ai/install.sh | bash -> ~/.local/bin/claudeFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST07
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandrun-server.sh:1723 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionschmod +x "$pal_wrapper"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsrun-server.sh:1062 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesprint_error ".env.example not found!"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandDockerfile:66 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsRUN mkdir -p tmp && chown -R paluser:paluser tmpFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsutils/env.py:87 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"""Expose the loaded .env mapping for diagnostics/logging."""Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_utils.py:34 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# /etc/passwd should be blocked as it's under /etc (dangerous path)Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandDockerfile:70 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsRUN chmod +x /usr/local/bin/healthcheck.pyFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
Destructive file system command detectedDockerfile:49 · Destructive file system command detected&& rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/* \Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Remote installer piped to shellrun-server.sh:342 · Remote installer piped to shellecho " curl https://pyenv.run | bash" >&2Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST07
MEDIUM
Destructive file system command detectedDockerfile:10 · Destructive file system command detected&& rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandDockerfile:63 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsRUN mkdir -p logs && chown -R paluser:paluser logsFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsrun-server.sh:1061 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesif [[ ! -f .env.example ]]; thenFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsrun-server.sh:1056 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesprint_success ".env file already exists"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsutils/env.py:39 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesdotenv_mapping: Optional mapping used instead of reading the .env file.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈4,045 tok
3 files · 81 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for pal-mcp-server-ramarivera@9.8.2 as of 5 h ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.

What would make this Verified

10 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Pipe-to-shell pattern≈ +9 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  2. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim ramarivera: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  3. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  4. Privileged sudo command≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  5. Direct script execution from GitHub raw URL≈ +4 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
  6. File type combined with upload action≈ +2 on the totalRemove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
Publish a new version to PyPI, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim ramariveraPropose a patch to the maintainer