Skills/PyPI/pal-mcp-server

pal-mcp-server@11.9.1

CAUTION· not started

Publisher claims: "AI-powered MCP server with multiple model providers" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher pypi · publishing for 723 daysInstalls 1,897Last detonated 3d ago
What would fix thisWatchDispute verdict

Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
GEMINI_API_KEYConfiguration, not credentials: DISABLED_TOOLS, PAL_PROGRESS_HEARTBEAT_SECONDS, PAL_WORKSPACE_ROOT, PLACEHOLDER_KEYS, UV_CACHE_DIR, UV_PYTHON_INSTALL_DIR
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso dialx.ai, x.ai, astral.sh, openrouter.ai, models.dev, google.com, githubusercontent.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names dialx.ai, x.ai, astral.sh, openrouter.ai, models.dev, google.com, githubusercontent.com as well as its own vendor. The guard injects GEMINI_API_KEY only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx pal-mcp-server

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-11 and scored it 70/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsAGENTS.md:12 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files- `./run-server.sh` — bootstrap the MCP server (handles cross-platform install, `.env`, and Claude registration).Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsAGENTS.md:77 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files…b.com>. ## Security & Configuration Tips Store API keys and provider URLs in `.env` or your MCP client config; never commit secrets or generated log artifacts. Us…Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsproviders/custom.py:38 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files#: The value ``.env.example`` ships for ``CUSTOM_API_KEY``. Declaring itFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsrun-server.sh:114 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesif [[ -f .env ]]; thenFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsproviders/custom.py:127 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"%s is still set to the .env.example placeholder; treating the endpoint as unauthenticated",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsrun-server.sh:7 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# uv-based dev bootstrap: syncs dependencies into .venv via uv, prepares .env,Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsrun-server.sh:79 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files$0 Set up the dev environment (sync deps, prepare .env)Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsrun-server.sh:110 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# .env handlingFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
CRITICAL
Pipe-to-shell patternrun-server.sh:100 · Pipe-to-shell pattern — downloads and immediately executes remote codeecho " curl -LsSf https://astral.sh/uv/install.sh | sh" >&2Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST06
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsutils/env.py:87 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"""Expose the loaded .env mapping for diagnostics/logging."""Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/smoke_mcpb.py:57 · Python subprocess execution detectedreturn subprocess.run(["uv", *args], capture_output=True, text=True, check=True).stdout.strip()Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsutils/env.py:36 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"""Reload .env values and recompute override semantics.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsrun-server.sh:115 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesprint_success ".env file already exists"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/build_mcpb.py:61 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(cmd, cwd=cwd, capture_output=True, text=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/smoke_mcpb.py:90 · Python subprocess execution detectedchild = subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionconfig.py:126 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files# - prompt.txt file content (alternative user input method)Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathstools/chat.py:240 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# path-traversal attempts (e.g. ``/etc``, ``~/.ssh``, ``../..``)Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Destructive file system command detectedDockerfile:65 · Destructive file system command detected&& rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/* \Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)CLAUDE.md:59 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over network…ting signal. A blind routing benchmark ([#91](https://github.com/laurigates/pal-mcp-server/issues/91)) put 15 fixed requests through six candidate surfaces with names only: the 19-name surface routed 15/15, every surface that folded names …Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/tool_surface.py:32 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# Default preset from .env.example / README.md ("Enabling Additional Tools").Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsserver.py:179 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system fileslogger.info("PAL_MCP_FORCE_ENV_OVERRIDE enabled - .env file values will override system environment variables")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsutils/env.py:39 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesdotenv_mapping: Optional mapping used instead of reading the .env file.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsutils/env.py:61 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"""Return True when PAL_MCP_FORCE_ENV_OVERRIDE is enabled via the .env file."""Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Direct script execution from GitHub raw URLtools/version.py:93 · Direct script execution from GitHub raw URL — unverified code sourcegithub_url = "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/BeehiveInnovations/pal-mcp-server/main/config.py"Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)scripts/audit_model_registry.py:45 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over networkUSER_AGENT = "pal-mcp-server-model-audit/1 (+https://github.com/laurigates/pal-mcp-server)"Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandDockerfile:82 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsRUN chmod +x /usr/local/bin/healthcheck.pyFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsutils/env.py:17 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files_ENV_PATH = _PROJECT_ROOT / ".env"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/smoke_mcpb.py:9 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files.venv, a .env, a user config) can satisfy an import or a setting, completes theFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/build_mcpb.py:12 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesallowlist of tracked files, so neither a local .env nor a new top-levelFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandDockerfile:78 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsRUN mkdir -p logs tmp state && chown -R paluser:paluser logs tmp stateFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
Remote installer piped to shellrun-server.sh:100 · Remote installer piped to shellecho " curl -LsSf https://astral.sh/uv/install.sh | sh" >&2Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST07
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_utils.py:35 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filescontent, tokens = read_file_content("/etc/passwd")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/conftest.py:66 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# neither a shell value nor a .env value wins over it.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/conftest.py:59 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# Ensure tests operate with runtime environment rather than .env overrides during imports.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/conftest.py:189 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesitself. That breadth is deliberate -- it is what stops a developer's .envFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_utils.py:34 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# /etc/passwd should be blocked as it's under /etc (dangerous path)Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionserver.py:1338 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files# A prompt.txt is the request, not a context file: the tool puts its contentFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/conftest.py:129 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# populated ``os.environ`` from any local .env, so ``setdefault`` hereFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈2,901 tok
3 files · 81 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for pal-mcp-server@11.9.1 as of 3d ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.

What would make this Verified

10 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Pipe-to-shell pattern≈ +9 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  2. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim pypi: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  3. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  4. Direct script execution from GitHub raw URL≈ +4 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
  5. Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  6. File type combined with upload action≈ +2 on the totalRemove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
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