Skills/PyPI/pagerduty-mcp-server

pagerduty-mcp-server@4.1.0

VERIFIED· not started

Publisher claims: "MCP server for LLM agents to interact with PagerDuty SaaS" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher wpfleger96 · publishing for 596 daysInstalls 1,548Last detonated 6 h ago
$claude mcp add pagerduty-mcp-server -- uvx pagerduty-mcp-server
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Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
PAGERDUTY_API_TOKENPAGERDUTY_CLIENT_SECRETPAGERDUTY_OAUTH_CALLBACK_PORTConfiguration, not credentials: PAGERDUTY_CLIENT_ID, PAGERDUTY_USER_EMAIL
Where it talks to
pagerduty.com (its own)
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard. It asks for PAGERDUTY_API_TOKEN, PAGERDUTY_CLIENT_SECRET, PAGERDUTY_OAUTH_CALLBACK_PORT and talks to pagerduty.com. Give the credential to the guard, not the server: the value never enters the server's environment and only travels to the host you bind. What the tools do with a real credential was not observed.

$vet-skills run --secrets PAGERDUTY_API_TOKEN=pagerduty.com,PAGERDUTY_CLIENT_SECRET=pagerduty.com,PAGERDUTY_OAUTH_CALLBACK_PORT=pagerduty.com -- uvx pagerduty-mcp-server

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-14 and scored it 91/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.2sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.2sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/pagerduty_mcp_server/client.py:12 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# Load environment variables from .env fileFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05

No other findings across 6,056 lines in 40 files.

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈55 tok
1 file · 40 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for pagerduty-mcp-server@4.1.0 as of 5 h ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.