oxford-ledge-mcp@3.8.4
VERIFIED· not startedPublisher claims: "MCP server for Oxford Ledge — 29 tools built on U.S.-government public data (SEC EDGAR, FRED, U.S. Treasury, FDIC, USAspending, USPTO, CFTC): 28 served as filed or as Oxford Ledge derivations of it, plus 1 Oxford Ledge-authored value-investing corpus of attributed paraphrases — for SEC filings, fundamentals, institutional & insider ownership, macro rates, and BDC/private-credit holdings from Claude Desktop" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.- Tested
- the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
FRED_API_KEYOXFORD_LEDGE_API_KEYConfiguration, not credentials: OXFORD_LEDGE_URL- Where it talks to
- oxfordledge.com (its own)Also sec.gov, stlouisfed.org, evil.invalid — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names sec.gov, stlouisfed.org, evil.invalid as well as its own vendor. The guard injects FRED_API_KEY, OXFORD_LEDGE_API_KEY only into requests to oxfordledge.com (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-14 and scored it 93/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
for a C-stack overflow, which is a process kill rather than an error.Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.No other findings across 13,352 lines in 36 files.
Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for oxford-ledge-mcp@3.8.4 as of 6 h ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.