Skills/PyPI/owasp-agentic-mcp

owasp-agentic-mcp@1.0.9

VERIFIED· not started

Publisher claims: "OWASP Top 10 for AI Agents security assessment tools. Capabilities: full agent security scan, prompt injection detection, tool poisoning check, excessive agency, data leakage. Built by MEOK AI Labs." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher csoai-org · publishing for 214 daysInstalls 219Last detonated 5 h ago
$claude mcp add owasp-agentic-mcp -- uvx owasp-agentic-mcp
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Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
MEOK_API_KEYConfiguration, not credentials: MEOK_ATTEST_KEY, MEOK_PAYG_KEY, MEOK_VERIFY_TIMEOUT, MEOK_VERIFY_URL
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso proofof.ai, stripe.com, meok.ai — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names proofof.ai, stripe.com, meok.ai as well as its own vendor. The guard injects MEOK_API_KEY only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx owasp-agentic-mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-14 and scored it 95/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

LOW
Prompt injectionsmithery.yaml:17 · Prompt injection — known jailbreak technique reference · informational: not an instruction filedescription: "Check text for prompt injection attack patterns including instruction override, jailbreak attempts, system prompt extraction, and encoding attacks"Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01

No other findings across 2,076 lines in 28 files.

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈88 tok
1 file · 28 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for owasp-agentic-mcp@1.0.9 as of 5 h ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.

owasp-agentic-mcp@1.0.9 safety verdict: Verified (not started) — KillerSkills