Skills/PyPI/orionbelt-semantic-layer-mcp

orionbelt-semantic-layer-mcp@3.0.0

VERIFIED· install only

Publisher claims: "Thin MCP server for OrionBelt Semantic Layer — delegates to REST API" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher ralforion · publishing for 249 daysInstalls 675Last detonated 8 h ago
$claude mcp add orionbelt-semantic-layer-mcp -- uvx orionbelt-semantic-layer-mcp
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Coverage

Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only.
Tested
every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
no credential variables read in the code
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso docker.com, debian.org — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
use of the skill by an agent

Connect it under the guard. Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only. The code names no credential variable; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx orionbelt-semantic-layer-mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario; nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only) on 2026-11-14 and scored it 84/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

LOW
Prompt injectionTHIRD_PARTY_NOTICES.md:2493 · Prompt injection — known jailbreak technique reference · informational: not an instruction file* Dan Michael Heggø -- Turtle lexerFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandscripts/setup-hooks.sh:56 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionschmod +x "$HOOK_PATH"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsserver.py:56 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"""Configuration loaded from environment variables / .env file."""Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsAGENTS.md:22 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesuv run server.py # run locally (reads .env; see .env.example)Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsserver.py:5118 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"""Run the MCP server using settings from environment / .env file."""Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsserver.py:59 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesenv_file=".env",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
LOW
Prompt injectionTHIRD_PARTY_NOTICES.md:2538 · Prompt injection — known jailbreak technique reference · informational: not an instruction file* Dan Lazin, Google LLC -- GoogleSQL lexerFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/release.sh:272 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# needs API_BASE_URL (the repo's .env supplied it before); a dummy will do,Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandscripts/check-action-pins.sh:59 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes# set -e would kill the run with no file or line to point at.Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈1,851 tok
3 files · 34 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for orionbelt-semantic-layer-mcp@3.0.0 as of 8 h ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.