Skills/PyPI/oracle.oci-usage-mcp-server

oracle.oci-usage-mcp-server@2.0.3

VERIFIED· install only

Publisher claims: "OCI Usage MCP server" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher oracle · publishing for 397 daysInstalls 280Last detonated 11 h ago
$claude mcp add oracle.oci-usage-mcp-server -- uvx oracle.oci-usage-mcp-server
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Coverage

Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only.
Tested
every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
IDCS_CLIENT_SECRETConfiguration, not credentials: IDCS_AUDIENCE, IDCS_CLIENT_ID, IDCS_DOMAIN, IDCS_REQUIRED_SCOPES, OCI_CIRCUIT_BREAKER_FAILURE_THRESHOLD, OCI_CIRCUIT_BREAKER_RECOVERY_TIMEOUT, OCI_CONFIG_FILE, OCI_CONFIG_PROFILE, OCI_REGION, ORACLE_MCP_BASE_URL, ORACLE_MCP_HOST, ORACLE_MCP_PORT
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso oracle.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
use of the skill by an agent

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names oracle.com as well as its own vendor. The guard injects IDCS_CLIENT_SECRET only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx oracle.oci-usage-mcp-server

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario; nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only) on 2026-11-14 and scored it 89/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathspyproject.toml:52 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"/.env",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)oracle/oci_usage_mcp_server/tests/test_usage_tools.py:168 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over network@patch("oracle.oci_usage_mcp_server.server._get_http_config_and_signer")Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathspyproject.toml:53 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"/.env.*",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈1,275 tok
2 files · 12 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for oracle.oci-usage-mcp-server@2.0.3 as of 10 h ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.