opusclip-mcp@0.3.0
CAUTION· startup onlyPublisher claims: "Connect your agent to OpusClip — turn long videos into AI-curated short clips." Observed in sandbox: sends data to focused-horizon-38.authkit.app.
Coverage
Startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested.- Tested
- server startup over stdio (initialize sent) · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials
What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
- no credential variables read in the code
- Where it talks to
- opus.pro (its own)Also nodejs.org — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · contacted focused-horizon-38.authkit.app (undeclared)
- What we could not test
- the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials
Find out what these hosts are first. In the honeypot it contacted focused-horizon-38.authkit.app, which nothing in the package names as its own. If that is the vendor's service, fine; if you cannot place it, do not connect it.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested) on 2026-11-14 and scored it 59/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Summary: sends data to focused-horizon-38.authkit.app.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 23 s · 2 scenariosStatic findings
if npx is None:Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.proc = subprocess.run([npx, "-y", "mcp-remote", ENDPOINT, *sys.argv[1:]])Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.npx = shutil.which("npx")Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.// that only speak stdio (or want a one-line `npx @opusclip/mcp` install) work too.Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for opusclip-mcp@0.3.0 as of 13 h ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.
What would make this Verified
21 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Reads credential files≈ +27 on the totalThe sandbox saw reads under ~/.ssh, ~/.aws, ~/.npmrc, ~/.config or similar. Read only files inside the project, and only the ones the task needs. Seen: ~/.mcp-auth/mcp-remote-0.1.49/300c2d7cc7175fb2da283fa51381446f_tokens.json.
- Contacts a host you did not declare≈ +23 on the totalList every host you talk to in SKILL.md frontmatter (`network: [api.example.com]`), or stop contacting the ones you cannot justify.
- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim opus-pro: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Touches files outside the project≈ +7 on the totalKeep reads and writes inside the working directory, or declare the exact paths in `filesystem:` and explain why in the README.
- npx invocation of non-well-known package≈ +2 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
- Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.