Skills/PyPI/optix-mcp-server

optix-mcp-server@1.0.1

CAUTION· not started

Publisher claims: "MCP server for source code analysis" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher optix-mcp-server-contributors · publishing for 290 daysInstalls 73Last detonated 15 h ago
What would fix thisWatchDispute verdict

Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
AZURE_OPENAI_API_KEYOPENAI_API_KEYOPENROUTER_API_KEY or --configure-api-keysConfiguration, not credentials: AZURE_OPENAI_ENDPOINT, DASHBOARD_ENABLED, DASHBOARD_HOST, DASHBOARD_PORT, DISABLED_TOOLS, EXPERT_ANALYSIS_ENABLED, EXPERT_ANALYSIS_MAX_FINDINGS, EXPERT_ANALYSIS_TIMEOUT, OPTIX_LLM_PROVIDER, OPTIX_LOG_FILE, OPTIX_LOG_LEVEL, SERVER_NAME, TRANSPORT
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso astral.sh, mitre.org — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names astral.sh, mitre.org as well as its own vendor. The guard injects AZURE_OPENAI_API_KEY, OPENAI_API_KEY, OPENROUTER_API_KEY only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx optix-mcp-server

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-13 and scored it 75/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths; Pipe-to-shell pattern. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.2sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.2sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/configure_mcp_client.py:221 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesenv_file: Path to .env fileFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedcli/installer/uv_manager.py:55 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathscli/installer/env_writer.py:8 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"""Writer for .env configuration files."""Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
CRITICAL
Pipe-to-shell patterncli/installer/uv_manager.py:102 · Pipe-to-shell pattern — downloads and immediately executes remote codecmd = ["sh", "-c", "curl -LsSf https://astral.sh/uv/install.sh | sh"]Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST06
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/configure_mcp_client.py:261 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# Write updated .env fileFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathscli/installer/env_writer.py:22 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesreturn optix_dir / ".env"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathscli/installer/env_writer.py:11 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"""Get the .env file path based on scope.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsserver.py:36 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# Load .env files: global config first, then local (local overrides global)Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtools/pr_comment/github.py:33 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedcli/installer/uv_manager.py:105 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathstools/devops_audit/guidance.py:78 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"Check for secrets in layers (COPY/ADD of .env, credentials)",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
LOW
Instructs the agent to modify its persistent memory or instruction filestools/a11_tool_context.md:514 · Instructs the agent to modify its persistent memory or instruction files · informational: not an instruction file- Update CLAUDE.md with a11y_audit toolFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathscli/installer/env_writer.py:17 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesPath to the .env fileFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathscli/installer/env_writer.py:1 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files""".env file generation for Optix configuration."""Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsserver.py:37 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesglobal_env = Path.home() / ".optix" / ".env"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/configure_mcp_client.py:314 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system fileshelp="Path to .env file (for API key configuration)"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Remote installer piped to shellcli/installer/uv_manager.py:102 · Remote installer piped to shellcmd = ["sh", "-c", "curl -LsSf https://astral.sh/uv/install.sh | sh"]Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST07
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtools/view_history/utils.py:49 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈47 tok
1 file · 81 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for optix-mcp-server@1.0.1 as of 15 h ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.

What would make this Verified

5 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Pipe-to-shell pattern≈ +9 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  2. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim optix-mcp-server-contributors: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  3. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  4. Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  5. Remote installer piped to shell≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
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