opentargets-mcp@0.7.0
CAUTION· not startedPublisher claims: "MCP server for Open Targets Platform biomedical data access" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.- Tested
- the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
- no credential variables read in the code
- Where it talks to
- opentargets.org (its own)
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
Connect it under the guard. Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed. The code names no credential variable and talks to opentargets.org, its own; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-13 and scored it 70/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: References a credential file in the home directory; Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
Unlike aiohttp's ``trust_env``, this never reads ~/.netrc or OS proxyFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.Unlike aiohttp's ``trust_env``, this never reads ~/.netrc or OS proxyFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.# trust_env would also send ~/.netrc credentials; see _env_proxy.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.Unlike aiohttp's ``trust_env``, this never reads ~/.netrc or OS proxyFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.# trust_env would also send ~/.netrc credentials; see _env_proxy.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.proxy_env.setenv("HTTPS_PROXY", "http://user:secret@[bad")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.settings. Proxy credentials move into a ``Proxy-Authorization`` header soFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.proxy_env.setenv("HTTP_PROXY", "http://user:[email protected]:3128")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.proxy_env.setenv("HTTPS_PROXY", "http://user:[email protected]:3128")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.proxy_env.setenv("HTTPS_PROXY", "http://user:[email protected]:3128")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.proxy_env.setenv("HTTP_PROXY", "http://user:[email protected]:3128")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for opentargets-mcp@0.7.0 as of 15 h ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.
What would make this Verified
10 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Reads credential paths from the home directory≈ +9 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim nickzren: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- References a credential file in the home directory≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- Credential pass-through configuration≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- URL with embedded credentials≈ +2 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.