Skills/PyPI/openroute-mcp

openroute-mcp@0.0.4

VERIFIED· not started

Publisher claims: "MCP server to plan routes using OpenRouteService API, for activities such as hiking or mountain biking." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher vemonet · publishing for 402 daysInstalls 197Last detonated 15 h ago
$claude mcp add openroute-mcp -- uvx openroute-mcp
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Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
OPENROUTESERVICE_API_KEY or --openroute-api-key
Where it talks to
openrouteservice.org (its own)Also gpx.studio, githubusercontent.com, admin.ch, trailforks.com, lobehub.com, wikiloc.com, outdooractive.com, alltrails.com, rapidapi.com, openstreetmap.org — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names gpx.studio, githubusercontent.com, admin.ch, trailforks.com, lobehub.com, wikiloc.com, outdooractive.com, alltrails.com, rapidapi.com, openstreetmap.org as well as its own vendor. The guard injects OPENROUTESERVICE_API_KEY only into requests to openrouteservice.org (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --secrets OPENROUTESERVICE_API_KEY=openrouteservice.org -- uvx openroute-mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-13 and scored it 90/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathscompose.yml:11 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files- .envFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Destructive file system command detectedDockerfile:5 · Destructive file system command detected# RUN apt-get update && apt-get install -y git && rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈63 tok
1 file · 21 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for openroute-mcp@0.0.4 as of 15 h ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.