Skills/PyPI/openproject-ce-mcp

openproject-ce-mcp@0.4.5

CAUTION· not started

Publisher claims: "MCP server for OpenProject Community Edition with guarded read/write support." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher jtauschl · publishing for 136 daysInstalls 2,259Last detonated 16 h ago
What would fix thisWatchDispute verdict

Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
no credential variables read in the code
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso openproject.invalid, placeholder.invalid — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it under the guard. Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed. The code names no credential variable; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx openproject-ce-mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-13 and scored it 68/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Prompting user to enter sensitive credentials; Pipe-to-shell pattern. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/openproject_ce_mcp/setup_cli.py:849 · Python subprocess execution detectedin_work_tree = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/openproject_ce_mcp/doctor/hosts.py:401 · Python subprocess execution detectedcompleted = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Remote installer piped to shellsrc/openproject_ce_mcp/setup_cli.py:965 · Remote installer piped to shell# No interactive input (e.g. `curl … | sh` left stdin as the pipe).Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST07
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/openproject_ce_mcp/setup_cli.py:309 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"""Remove any existing [mcp_servers.openproject] / .env tables from TOML text.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)src/openproject_ce_mcp/strict_mcpserver.py:88 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over networkthrough-``self``) dispatch wiring: ``MCPServer.__init__`` passesFix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/openproject_ce_mcp/setup_cli.py:860 · Python subprocess execution detectedignored = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/openproject_ce_mcp/doctor/codex.py:140 · Python subprocess execution detectedprocess = subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/openproject_ce_mcp/setup_cli.py:756 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run([uv, "sync"], cwd=_REPO_ROOT, check=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/openproject_ce_mcp/setup_cli.py:762 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run([str(pip), "install", "-e", "."], cwd=_REPO_ROOT, check=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/openproject_ce_mcp/doctor/codex.py:164 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
CRITICAL
Prompting user to enter sensitive credentialssrc/openproject_ce_mcp/setup_cli.py:1561 · Prompting user to enter sensitive credentials — social engineeringprint(" Please re-enter your credentials.")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST03
CRITICAL
Pipe-to-shell patternsrc/openproject_ce_mcp/setup_cli.py:965 · Pipe-to-shell pattern — downloads and immediately executes remote code# No interactive input (e.g. `curl … | sh` left stdin as the pipe).Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST06
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/openproject_ce_mcp/doctor/probe.py:95 · Python subprocess execution detectedcompleted = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/openproject_ce_mcp/setup_cli.py:760 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run([sys.executable, "-m", "venv", str(VENV)], check=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandsrc/openproject_ce_mcp/setup_cli.py:816 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsOrder: write a temp file in the same directory, chmod it, back up anyFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈59 tok
1 file · 81 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for openproject-ce-mcp@0.4.5 as of 16 h ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.

What would make this Verified

12 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Prompting user to enter sensitive credentials≈ +9 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  2. Pipe-to-shell pattern≈ +9 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  3. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim jtauschl: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  4. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  5. Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  6. Remote installer piped to shell≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
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