Skills/PyPI/openom-mcp

openom-mcp@0.1.5

VERIFIED· not started

Publisher claims: "openOM MCP server - deterministic tool surface over openom-core. Zero inference, ever." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher vervelio-labs · publishing for 81 daysInstalls 81Last detonated 17 h ago
$claude mcp add openom-mcp -- uvx openom-mcp
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Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
OPENOM_R2_ACCESS_KEYOPENOM_R2_SECRET_KEYConfiguration, not credentials: OPENOM_MCP_BLOB_BACKEND, OPENOM_MCP_HOST, OPENOM_MCP_LIMITER, OPENOM_MCP_LOG, OPENOM_R2_BUCKET, OPENOM_R2_ENDPOINT, OPENOM_REDIS_URL, OPENOM_TRUSTED_PROXY_HEADER
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the code
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard. It asks for OPENOM_R2_ACCESS_KEY, OPENOM_R2_SECRET_KEY and talks to its vendor. Give the credential to the guard, not the server: the value never enters the server's environment and only travels to the host you bind. What the tools do with a real credential was not observed.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx openom-mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-13 and scored it 87/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_remote.py:102 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesres = tools.om_read({"path": "/etc/passwd"})Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandsrc/openom_mcp/tools.py:218 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processessession would kill the broker's whole Claude Desktop connection - so the pymupdf parse verbs runFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_ssrf.py:68 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesfor bad in ("http://h/x", "file:///etc/passwd", "data:application/pdf;base64,AA", "ftp://h/x"):Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_boundary.py:56 · Python subprocess execution detectedout = subprocess.run( # noqa: S603 - fixed argv, our own interpreterFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_resolve.py:51 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesr.resolve({"path": "/etc/passwd"})Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈57 tok
1 file · 38 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for openom-mcp@0.1.5 as of 17 h ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.