Skills/PyPI/openhab-mcp-server

openhab-mcp-server@1.1.1

CAUTION· not started

Publisher claims: "Model Context Protocol server for openHAB home automation" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher openhab · publishing for 336 daysInstalls 77Last detonated 18 h ago
What would fix thisWatchDispute verdict

Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
OPENHAB_TOKEN or --openhab-tokenConfiguration, not credentials: HEALTH_CHECK_PORT, OPENHAB_RETRY_ATTEMPTS, OPENHAB_RETRY_BACKOFF_FACTOR, OPENHAB_RETRY_MAX_DELAY, OPENHAB_TIMEOUT, OPENHAB_URL
Where it talks to
openhab.org (its own)
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard. It asks for OPENHAB_TOKEN and talks to openhab.org. Give the credential to the guard, not the server: the value never enters the server's environment and only travels to the host you bind. What the tools do with a real credential was not observed.

$vet-skills run --secrets OPENHAB_TOKEN=openhab.org -- uvx openhab-mcp-server

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-13 and scored it 78/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Auto-update or dynamic fetch configuration. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.2sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)src/openhab_mcp_server/cli.py:40 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over networkopenhab-mcp-server --openhab-url http://192.168.1.100:8080Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsrc/openhab_mcp_server/utils/script_context.py:82 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesself.log(f"Error sending command to {item_name}: {e}")Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_packaging_unit.py:36 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run([Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Destructive file system command detectedtests/test_security_unit.py:116 · Destructive file system command detected"; rm -rf /", # Command injectionFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/openhab_mcp_server/utils/security.py:42 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesr'(/etc/passwd)',Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Destructive command against a filesystem root or devicetests/test_security_unit.py:116 · Destructive command against a filesystem root or device"; rm -rf /", # Command injectionFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Destructive command against a filesystem root or devicetests/test_security_unit.py:32 · Destructive command against a filesystem root or device"; rm -rf /",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/release.py:71 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/install_verify.py:19 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/build.py:18 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(cmd, check=True, capture_output=True, text=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/dev_install.py:17 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(cmd, check=True, capture_output=True, text=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Destructive file system command detectedtests/test_security_unit.py:32 · Destructive file system command detected"; rm -rf /",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/release.py:24 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Auto-update or dynamic fetch configurationsrc/openhab_mcp_server/models.py:515 · Auto-update or dynamic fetch configuration — agent may load new code at runtimeauto_update: Optional[bool] = Field(None, description="Whether the link should auto-update the item")Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
LOW
URL to a private-network addresssrc/openhab_mcp_server/cli.py:40 · URL to a private-network address — a LAN or development targetopenhab-mcp-server --openhab-url http://192.168.1.100:8080Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_security_unit.py:33 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"../../../etc/passwd"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
LOW
Rule addition attemptREADME.md:629 · Rule addition attempt — injecting new instructions · informational: not an instruction file- `create_rule(rule_definition)`: Create a new ruleFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandDockerfile:47 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionschown -R openhab:openhab /appFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
Destructive file system command detectedDockerfile:35 · Destructive file system command detectedrm -rf /var/cache/apk/*Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_packaging_unit.py:50 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run([Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈54 tok
1 file · 81 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for openhab-mcp-server@1.1.1 as of 17 h ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.

What would make this Verified

2 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim openhab: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  3. Auto-update or dynamic fetch configuration≈ +4 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
  4. MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)≈ +2 on the totalNamespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
  5. File type combined with upload action≈ +2 on the totalRemove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
  6. Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
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