openemr-mcp@0.1.0
VERIFIED· not startedPublisher claims: "MCP server for OpenEMR — patient, medication, FDA drug safety, and clinical trajectory tools for Claude Desktop, Cursor, and any MCP-compatible AI client" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.- Tested
- the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
OPENEMR_DB_PASSWORDOPENEMR_OAUTH_CLIENT_IDOPENEMR_OAUTH_CLIENT_SECRETOPENEMR_OAUTH_PASSWORDOPENEMR_OAUTH_SITEOPENEMR_OAUTH_USERNAMEOPENFDA_API_KEYConfiguration, not credentials: DRUG_INTERACTION_SOURCE, ENV, INFERMEDICA_APP_ID, INFERMEDICA_APP_KEY, OPENEMR_API_BASE_URL, OPENEMR_API_VERIFY_SSL, OPENEMR_DATA_SOURCE, OPENEMR_DB_HOST, OPENEMR_DB_NAME, OPENEMR_DB_PORT, OPENEMR_DB_USER, OPENEMR_DOCKER_CWD, OPENEMR_DOCKER_SERVICE, OPENEMR_ENABLE_CLIENT_VIA_SQL, OPENFDA_SOURCE, SYMPTOM_SOURCE- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the codeAlso fda.gov, nih.gov, infermedica.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names fda.gov, nih.gov, infermedica.com as well as its own vendor. The guard injects OPENEMR_DB_PASSWORD, OPENEMR_OAUTH_CLIENT_ID, OPENEMR_OAUTH_CLIENT_SECRET, OPENEMR_OAUTH_PASSWORD, OPENEMR_OAUTH_SITE, OPENEMR_OAUTH_USERNAME, OPENFDA_API_KEY only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-13 and scored it 85/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
- [ ] Environment variable changes reflected in `.env.example`Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.result = subprocess.run(cmd, cwd=s.openemr_docker_cwd, capture_output=True, text=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out._cwd_env = dotenv_values(Path.cwd() / ".env") if (Path.cwd() / ".env").exists() else {}Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.# Precedence: process env > cwd .envFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.# Load .env defaults from cwd only.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for openemr-mcp@0.1.0 as of 17 h ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.