Skills/PyPI/openapi-to-mcp-cli

openapi-to-mcp-cli@0.10.0

CAUTION· not started

Publisher claims: "Generate, run, and test Node.js/TypeScript MCP servers from OpenAPI specifications." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher nihal1294 · publishing for 55 daysInstalls 90Last detonated 19 h ago
What would fix thisWatchDispute verdict

Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
AUTH_BEARER_TOKENAUTH_COOKIE_API_KEYAUTH_HEADER_API_KEYAUTH_QUERY_API_KEYConfiguration, not credentials: BEFORE_SHA, GITHUB_OUTPUT, GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso swagger.io — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names swagger.io as well as its own vendor. The guard injects AUTH_BEARER_TOKEN, AUTH_COOKIE_API_KEY, AUTH_HEADER_API_KEY, AUTH_QUERY_API_KEY only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx openapi-to-mcp-cli

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-13 and scored it 68/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.2sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/e2e_generated_server.sh:184 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesif [[ -f "${output_dir}/.env.example" && ! -f "${output_dir}/.env" ]]; thenFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsopenapi_to_mcp/common/utils.py:12 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"""Parses a .env file into a dictionary."""Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/e2e_cli_matrix.sh:102 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesreplace_or_append_env_var "${output_dir}/.env" "TARGET_API_BASE_URL" "$TARGET_API_BASE_URL"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/e2e_container.sh:37 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"if (process.getuid() === 0 || require('node:fs').existsSync('/app/.env')) process.exit(1)"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsopenapi_to_mcp/common/utils.py:36 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesParses env source from JSON string, JSON file, or .env file.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
CRITICAL
Destructive command against a filesystem root or devicescripts/workflow.sh:181 · Destructive command against a filesystem root or devicerm -rf \Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsopenapi_to_mcp/common/utils.py:30 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesraise ValueError(f"Failed to parse .env file '{file_path}': {e}") from eFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/e2e_container.sh:34 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesprintf 'BUILD_CONTEXT_SENTINEL=must-not-be-copied\n' > "$MCP_CONTAINER_DIR/.env"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/e2e_cli_matrix.sh:99 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesif [[ -f "${output_dir}/.env.example" && ! -f "${output_dir}/.env" ]]; thenFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
CRITICAL
Destructive command against a filesystem root or devicescripts/workflow.sh:206 · Destructive command against a filesystem root or devicerm -rf \Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/e2e_cli_matrix.sh:100 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filescp "${output_dir}/.env.example" "${output_dir}/.env"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsopenapi_to_mcp/common/utils.py:40 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesor a path to a .env file.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsopenapi_to_mcp/common/utils.py:28 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesraise ValueError(f".env file not found at: {file_path}") from errFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/integration/test_cli.py:188 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesoutput_dir / ".env.example"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/release_automation.py:66 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run( # noqa: S603Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/release_metadata.py:27 · Python subprocess execution detectedreturn subprocess.check_output(["git", *args], text=True).strip() # noqa: S603, S607Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/release_automation.py:333 · Python subprocess execution detecteddata = subprocess.check_output( # noqa: S603Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/workflow.sh:25 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesGenerate MCP server in OUTPUT_DIR and create/update .env.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/unit/test_commands_run.py:96 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesenv_contents = (output_dir / ".env").read_text(encoding="utf-8")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandscripts/e2e_generated_server.sh:117 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processesif kill -0 "$pid" >/dev/null 2>&1; thenFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/detect_release.py:21 · Python subprocess execution detectedprior = subprocess.check_output( # noqa: S603Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/unit/test_commands_run.py:136 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesenv_contents = (output_dir / ".env").read_text(encoding="utf-8")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionscripts/e2e_generated_server.sh:286 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesprintf '%s/%s.log\n' "$TMP_ROOT" "$(basename "$output_dir")"Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/unit/test_common_utils.py:42 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesresult = _parse_dotenv("fake_path/.env")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/release_automation.py:367 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run(fetch_command, check=True) # noqa: S603Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionscripts/e2e_cli_matrix.sh:293 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesstart_run_command "${TMP_ROOT}/run-no-validation.log" "$RUN_NO_VALIDATION_OUTPUT_DIR" --runtime-validation noneFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
Process kill commandscripts/e2e_generated_server.sh:60 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processesif kill -0 "$pid" >/dev/null 2>&1; thenFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/release_contracts.py:526 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run( # noqa: S603Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/release_policy_changes.py:180 · Python subprocess execution detectedreturn subprocess.check_output(["git", *arguments], text=True) # noqa: S603, S607Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandscripts/e2e_cli_matrix.sh:113 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processeskill "$pid" >/dev/null 2>&1 || trueFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/unit/test_commands_run.py:66 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files(output_dir / ".env.example").write_text(Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/detect_release.py:28 · Python subprocess execution detectedexisting_tag_ref = subprocess.check_output( # noqa: S603Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)scripts/e2e_container.sh:32 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over network--output-dir "$MCP_CONTAINER_DIR" --mcp-server-name container-example --transport streamable-httpFix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/release_contracts.py:553 · Python subprocess execution detectedcompleted = subprocess.run( # noqa: S603Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandscripts/e2e_generated_server.sh:55 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processeskill "$HTTP_SERVER_PID" >/dev/null 2>&1 || trueFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/unit/test_commands_run.py:31 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files(output_dir / ".env.example").write_text(Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/e2e_generated_server.sh:188 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesreplace_or_append_env_var "${output_dir}/.env" "TARGET_API_BASE_URL" "$TARGET_API_BASE_URL"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandscripts/e2e_generated_server.sh:61 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processeskill "$pid" >/dev/null 2>&1 || trueFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/unit/test_common_utils.py:51 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"""Test behavior when .env file is not found."""Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/workflow.sh:135 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesif [[ -f "${OUTPUT_DIR}/.env.example" && ! -f "${OUTPUT_DIR}/.env" ]]; thenFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/unit/test_common_utils.py:10 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"""Test parsing a valid .env file."""Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/release_contracts.py:484 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files(auth_project / ".env.example").read_text(encoding="utf-8"),Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/release_contracts.py:280 · Python subprocess execution detectedprocess = subprocess.Popen( # noqa: S603Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandscripts/e2e_generated_server.sh:54 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processesif [[ -n "$HTTP_SERVER_PID" ]] && kill -0 "$HTTP_SERVER_PID" >/dev/null 2>&1; thenFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/e2e_generated_server.sh:185 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filescp "${output_dir}/.env.example" "${output_dir}/.env"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/unit/test_commands_run.py:112 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files(output_dir / ".env.example").write_text(Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Destructive file system command detectedscripts/workflow.sh:206 · Destructive file system command detectedrm -rf \Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/release_automation.py:185 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run( # noqa: S603Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionscripts/e2e_cli_matrix.sh:287 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesstart_run_command "${TMP_ROOT}/run.log" "$RUN_OUTPUT_DIR" --max-concurrency 7Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/workflow.sh:136 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filescp "${OUTPUT_DIR}/.env.example" "${OUTPUT_DIR}/.env"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/unit/test_common_utils.py:34 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"""Test parsing a .env file with lines that don't have '='."""Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/unit/test_common_utils.py:23 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesresult = _parse_dotenv("fake_path/.env")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/release_contracts.py:150 · Python subprocess execution detectedreturn subprocess.run( # noqa: S603Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Destructive file system command detectedscripts/workflow.sh:181 · Destructive file system command detectedrm -rf \Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈61 tok
1 file · 81 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for openapi-to-mcp-cli@0.10.0 as of 18 h ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.

What would make this Verified

12 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Destructive command against a filesystem root or device≈ +9 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  2. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim nihal1294: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  3. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  4. Destructive file system command detected≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  5. Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  6. Process kill command≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
Publish a new version to PyPI, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim nihal1294Propose a patch to the maintainer