Skills/PyPI/open-transcribe-mcp

open-transcribe-mcp@1.2.3

CAUTION· not started

Publisher claims: "Provider-independent speech-to-text over MCP." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher fbossiere · publishing for 69 daysInstalls 360Last detonated 20 h ago
What would fix thisWatchDispute verdict

Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
no credential variables read in the code
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso elevenlabs.io, groq.com, microsoft.com, azure.com, githubusercontent.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it under the guard. Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed. The code names no credential variable; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx open-transcribe-mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-13 and scored it 77/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.2sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
File permission modification commandscripts/build_deb.sh:69 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionschmod 0644 "$STAGE/usr/share/metainfo/io.github.fbossiere.OpenTranscribeSetup.metainfo.xml"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/open_transcribe/settings.py:158 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesManaged desktop mode uses this so an ambient ``OT_*`` variable, a working-directory ``.env``,Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/derive_deb_depends.py:78 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run( # noqa: S603 - argv is built from resolved tool paths onlyFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/check_deb_payload.py:17 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files".env.local",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/check_deb_payload.py:16 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files".env",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/check_distribution.py:11 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesPROHIBITED_SUFFIXES = {".env", ".key", ".pem", ".mp3", ".wav", ".m4a"}Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
URL with embedded credentialsscripts/build_tutorial_pdf.py:24 · URL with embedded credentials — may be phishing or credential leaking@import url('https://fonts.googleapis.com/css2?family=Inter:wght@400;500;600;700&family=JetBrains+Mono:wght@400;600&display=swap');Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST07
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/open_transcribe/settings.py:63 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesenv_file=".env",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/check_distribution.py:30 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesor Path(name).name == ".env"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/open_transcribe/desktop/clients/command.py:152 · Python subprocess execution detectedreturn subprocess.run( # noqa: S603 - fixed vector, absolute executable, no shellFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
LOW
Prompt injectionREADME.md:19 · Prompt injection — known jailbreak technique reference · informational: not an instruction fileOpenTranscribe does not jailbreak hardware or bypass access controls. It works only with audio the operator is authorized to access.Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/open_transcribe/desktop/cleanup_timer.py:100 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run( # noqa: S603 - fixed vector, absolute executable, no shellFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandsrc/open_transcribe/desktop/paths.py:120 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsrecovery=f"Run: chmod 600 {path}",Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/verify_deb.py:31 · Python subprocess execution detectedreturn subprocess.run( # noqa: S603 - fixed vectors built from resolved tool pathsFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈51 tok
1 file · 81 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for open-transcribe-mcp@1.2.3 as of 19 h ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.

What would make this Verified

3 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim fbossiere: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  3. URL with embedded credentials≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  4. File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
  5. Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
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