onem2m-mcp@0.4.1
VERIFIED· not startedPublisher claims: "Expose a oneM2M CSE to AI agents via the Model Context Protocol (MCP)" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.- Tested
- the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
ACME_MCP_AUTH_TOKENACME_MCP_AUTH_TOKENSACME_MCP_OAUTH_AUDIENCEACME_MCP_OAUTH_ISSUERACME_MCP_OAUTH_JWKS_URLMCP_TEST_TOKENConfiguration, not credentials: ACME_MCP_CSE_ADMIN, ACME_MCP_CSE_RN, ACME_MCP_CSE_URL, ACME_MCP_HOST, ACME_MCP_ORIGINATOR, ACME_MCP_ORIGINATOR_MAP, ACME_MCP_PORT, ACME_MCP_RVI, ACME_MCP_TLS_CERT, ACME_MCP_TLS_KEY- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the codeAlso etsi.org, example.org, acmecse.net — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names etsi.org, example.org, acmecse.net as well as its own vendor. The guard injects ACME_MCP_AUTH_TOKEN, ACME_MCP_AUTH_TOKENS, ACME_MCP_OAUTH_AUDIENCE, ACME_MCP_OAUTH_ISSUER, ACME_MCP_OAUTH_JWKS_URL, MCP_TEST_TOKEN only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-13 and scored it 93/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
Admin access is never used for tool calls; set `ACME_MCP_ORIGINATOR` to use a customFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.No other findings across 4,835 lines in 28 files.
Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for onem2m-mcp@0.4.1 as of 21 h ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.