Skills/PyPI/omv-mcp

omv-mcp@0.2.1

CAUTION· not started

Publisher claims: "MCP server for managing an OpenMediaVault NAS. Runs ON the NAS; consumed over stdio-over-SSH." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher naveen-busiraju · publishing for 124 daysInstalls 72Last detonated 20 h ago
What would fix thisWatchDispute verdict

Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
PORTAINER_API_KEYConfiguration, not credentials: OMV_HOST, OMV_SSH_KEY, OMV_SSH_PORT, OMV_SSH_USER, PORTAINER_ENDPOINT_ID, PORTAINER_URL
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso astral.sh — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names astral.sh as well as its own vendor. The guard injects PORTAINER_API_KEY only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx omv-mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-13 and scored it 71/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/omv_mcp/setup_cli.py:144 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"chmod 600 ~/.ssh/authorized_keys",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/omv_mcp/local.py:33 · Python subprocess execution detectedp = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file paths.github/PULL_REQUEST_TEMPLATE.md:30 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files- [ ] No secrets committed (`.env`, API keys, host IPs)Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/omv_mcp/config.py:38 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesload_dotenv(_PROJECT_ROOT / ".env", override=False)Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/omv_mcp/setup_cli.py:142 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesf"grep -qxF {qpub} ~/.ssh/authorized_keys 2>/dev/null || "Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/omv_mcp/portainer.py:28 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"the config.env / .env) to enable the Portainer stack tools."Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/omv_mcp/ssh_remote.py:6 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files``~/.ssh`` keys. Host keys are trust-on-first-use, persisted toFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/omv_mcp/config.py:10 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filescwd ``.env`` fallback — kept for Mode-A back-compat.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/omv_mcp/config.py:35 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# Legacy fallbacks: .env next to a source checkout (harmless no-op whenFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/omv_mcp/setup_cli.py:143 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesf"printf '%s\\n' {qpub} >> ~/.ssh/authorized_keys; "Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/omv_mcp/config.py:36 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# installed as a wheel), then a cwd .env if any.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/omv_mcp/setup_cli.py:141 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"mkdir -p ~/.ssh && chmod 700 ~/.ssh && "Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
CRITICAL
Pipe-to-shell patternsrc/omv_mcp/setup_cli.py:224 · Pipe-to-shell pattern — downloads and immediately executes remote codeclient, "curl -LsSf https://astral.sh/uv/install.sh | sh", timeout=300Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST06
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/omv_mcp/config.py:9 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files3. Legacy project-root ``.env`` (source checkouts deployed on the NAS) and aFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandsrc/omv_mcp/setup_cli.py:144 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissions"chmod 600 ~/.ssh/authorized_keys",Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/omv_mcp/setup_cli.py:281 · Python subprocess execution detectedres = subprocess.run(add, capture_output=True, text=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_remote_exec.py:99 · Python subprocess execution detectedout = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/omv_mcp/setup_cli.py:283 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run([claude, "mcp", "remove", "omv"], capture_output=True, text=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/omv_mcp/setup_cli.py:284 · Python subprocess execution detectedres = subprocess.run(add, capture_output=True, text=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Remote installer piped to shellsrc/omv_mcp/setup_cli.py:224 · Remote installer piped to shellclient, "curl -LsSf https://astral.sh/uv/install.sh | sh", timeout=300Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST07
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandsrc/omv_mcp/setup_cli.py:141 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissions"mkdir -p ~/.ssh && chmod 700 ~/.ssh && "Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandsrc/omv_mcp/setup_cli.py:240 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissions"&& chmod 600 ~/.config/omv-mcp/config.env")Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈57 tok
1 file · 30 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for omv-mcp@0.2.1 as of 20 h ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.

What would make this Verified

9 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Pipe-to-shell pattern≈ +9 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  2. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim naveen-busiraju: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  3. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  4. Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  5. File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
  6. Remote installer piped to shell≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
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