Skills/PyPI/omni-image-tools-mcp

omni-image-tools-mcp@0.6.2

VERIFIED· not started

Publisher claims: "MCP server with image tools (vision + processing) supporting multiple providers" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher alexlivre · publishing for 98 daysInstalls 93Last detonated 22 h ago
$claude mcp add omni-image-tools-mcp -- uvx omni-image-tools-mcp
WatchReport an issue

Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
MINIMAX_API_KEYOMNI_VISION_API_KEYConfiguration, not credentials: LMSTUDIO_BASE_URL, MINIMAX_BASE_URL, OLLAMA_ALLOWED_MODELS, OLLAMA_AUTO_PULL, OLLAMA_BASE_URL, OMNI_ALLOWED_DIRS, OMNI_FALLBACK_MODELS, OMNI_LANG, OMNI_OUTPUT_DIR, OMNI_RATE_LIMIT_PER_MIN, OMNI_VISION_CACHE, OMNI_VISION_DEFAULT_MODEL, OMNI_VISION_MAX_RETRIES, OMNI_VISION_PROVIDER, OMNI_VISION_TIMEOUT
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso minimax.io, minimaxi.com, openrouter.ai — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names minimax.io, minimaxi.com, openrouter.ai as well as its own vendor. The guard injects MINIMAX_API_KEY, OMNI_VISION_API_KEY only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx omni-image-tools-mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-13 and scored it 88/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.2sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
URL to the cloud instance metadata addresstests/test_download.py:26 · URL to the cloud instance metadata address — reads the VM's credentialsresult = await download_image("http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST07
LOW
URL to a private-network addresstests/test_security.py:55 · URL to a private-network address — a LAN or development targetassert is_safe_url("http://192.168.0.1/x") is FalseFix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_security.py:58 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesassert is_safe_url("file:///etc/passwd") is FalseFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
URL to the cloud instance metadata addresstests/test_security.py:47 · URL to the cloud instance metadata address — reads the VM's credentialsassert is_safe_url("http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/") is FalseFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST07
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_download.py:38 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesresult = await download_image("file:///etc/passwd")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
LOW
URL to a private-network addresstests/test_security.py:54 · URL to a private-network address — a LAN or development targetassert is_safe_url("http://10.0.0.1/x") is FalseFix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈60 tok
1 file · 81 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for omni-image-tools-mcp@0.6.2 as of 21 h ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.