Skills/PyPI/omada-mcp

omada-mcp@2.5.1

CAUTION· not started

Publisher claims: "Model Context Protocol server for TP-Link Omada SDN controllers (Web API v2, zero dependencies)" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher falehsub · publishing for 5 daysInstalls 784Last detonated 30 min ago

Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
LAB_ADMIN_PASSWORDLAB_VIEWER_PASSWORD or --require-tokens / --admin-password / --viewer-passwordConfiguration, not credentials: OMADA_ENV_FILE
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the code
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard. It asks for LAB_ADMIN_PASSWORD, LAB_VIEWER_PASSWORD and talks to its vendor. Give the credential to the guard, not the server: the value never enters the server's environment and only travels to the host you bind. What the tools do with a real credential was not observed.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx omada-mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

What changed since 2.3.0

vet-skills diff omada-mcp 2.3.0 2.5.1

In the sandbox, this version reached for nothing 2.3.0 did not. Compared from the two recorded runs, not from source.

2.3.0 was not run in the sandbox (install failed); the comparison covers what static analysis recorded only.

The guard can hold an update like this until someone approves it (runtime.on_change: hold). A change that only shows with a real credential, or on a path the run did not reach, is not in a trace and so not in this comparison.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-18 and scored it 76/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 1 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/write_selftest.py:15 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesOMADA_ENV_FILE=~/.config/omada-mcp/.env omada-mcp-write-selftestFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandsrc/omada_mcp/client.py:137 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processeswith contextlib.suppress(Exception): # pragma: no cover - never let logging kill the serverFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/omada_mcp/config.py:12 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files4. ``%APPDATA%\\omada-mcp\\.env`` (Windows only)Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/omada_mcp/config.py:3 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesNo third-party dependencies: the ``.env`` reader is a small, documented subset ofFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/generate_docs.py:237 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesenv_path = root / ".env.example"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathsDockerfile:32 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# docker run --rm --env-file .env omada-mcp --watch --interval 30Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/omada_mcp/config.py:13 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files5. ``$XDG_CONFIG_HOME/omada-mcp/.env`` or ``~/.config/omada-mcp/.env``Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/benchmark_clients.py:57 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/generate_docs.py:239 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system fileserrors.append("missing .env.example")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathsDockerfile:33 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# docker run --rm -p 9108:9108 --env-file .env omada-mcp --export-metrics --metrics-port 9108 --metrics-host 0.0.0.0Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandsrc/omada_mcp/doctor.py:222 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsf"Restrict permissions: chmod 600 <{config.env_origin}>"))Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/generate_docs.py:252 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system fileserrors.append(f".env.example missing server.json env var {name!r}")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/benchmark_clients.py:47 · Python subprocess execution detectedreturn subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/omada_mcp/__init__.py:11 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesconfig = load_config() # OMADA_ENV_FILE -> ./.env -> ~/.config/omada-mcp/.envFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/docker_lab_init.py:118 · Python subprocess execution detectedres = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/omada_mcp/config.py:11 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files3. ``./.env`` -- relative to the current working directoryFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/generate_docs.py:267 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system fileshelp="Verify docs/tools-reference.md, README.md, .env.example, and server.json have zero drift",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/generate_docs.py:244 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system fileserrors.append(f".env.example missing write tool name {wr_name!r}")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandDockerfile:21 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissions&& chown -R omada:omada /app /dataFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandsrc/omada_mcp/doctor.py:226 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsf"chmod 600 {config.env_file} (it holds the controller password)"))Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈59 tok
1 file · 81 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

Not checked against OSV yet; the weekly check has not reached this version.

What would make this Verified

4 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim falehsub: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  3. New publisher≈ +3 on the totalTime clears this on its own after 14 and 30 days. Claiming the handle (+50) is the fastest way past it.
  4. Process kill command≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  5. Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  6. File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
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