ogulcanaydogan-mcp-security-scanner@1.0.32
VERIFIED· not startedPublisher claims: "Security scanner for Model Context Protocol (MCP) servers. Detects prompt injection, tool poisoning, capability escalation, and rug-pull attacks." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.- Tested
- the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
VAULT_TOKENConfiguration, not credentials: OCI_CONFIG_FILE, OCI_CONFIG_PROFILE- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the codeAlso doppler.com, bitwarden.com, infisical.com, akeyless.io, gitea.com, codeberg.org, cloudflare.com, githubusercontent.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names doppler.com, bitwarden.com, infisical.com, akeyless.io, gitea.com, codeberg.org, cloudflare.com, githubusercontent.com as well as its own vendor. The guard injects VAULT_TOKEN only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-13 and scored it 83/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
"""Best-effort chmod hardening for cache/key artifacts."""Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.connector = MCPServerConnector("sse_server")Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.connector = MCPServerConnector("sse_server")Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.("passwd_path_access", re.compile(r"/etc/passwd", re.IGNORECASE)),Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.mcp-scan config claude_desktop_config.json --format html --output report.htmlFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.mcp-scan compare baseline.json "node server.js" --format html --output mutations.htmlFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for ogulcanaydogan-mcp-security-scanner@1.0.32 as of 21 h ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.