Skills/PyPI/ocp-mcp-server

ocp-mcp-server@0.2.0b13

VERIFIED· not started

Publisher claims: "Open Collaboration Platform (OCP) MCP server for Claude Desktop [BETA]" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher nemetschek · publishing for 140 daysInstalls 71Last detonated 22 h ago
$claude mcp add ocp-mcp-server -- uvx ocp-mcp-server
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Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
install scripts, with decoy credentials in place · second launch with the clock 45 days ahead · the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
no credential variables read in the code
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso bimplus.net, python.org, claude.ai, webhook.site, allplan.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it under the guard. Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed. The code names no credential variable; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx ocp-mcp-server

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (3 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-13 and scored it 85/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 1 s · 3 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessinstall script run in the sandbox
0.2sprocessexec /usr/bin/dirname
0.2sprocessexec /usr/bin/cut
0.2sprocessexited 1:
0.3sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.3sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.3sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.4sprocesssecond launch, clock +45 days, CI unset
0.5sprocessexec /usr/bin/dirname
0.5sprocessexec /tmp/ks-detonate-YQdc3g/later/home/work/acme-api/.claude/skills/OCP
0.5sprocessexited 127: ./install.sh: line 31: /tmp/ks-detonate-YQdc3g/later/home/work/acme-api/.claude/skills/OCP: No such file or directory

Static findings

MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagescripts/build_mcpb.sh:34 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codenpx --yes @anthropic-ai/mcpb pack . "$OUT_FILE"Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagescripts/build_mcpb.sh:26 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codeecho "Node.js / npx not found. Install Node.js to use the MCPB CLI." >&2Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
Process kill commandocp_mcp/usage_log.py:300 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processespass # a broken flush must never kill the workerFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagescripts/build_mcpb.sh:31 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codenpx --yes @anthropic-ai/mcpb validate manifest.jsonFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
File permission modification command.claude/settings.local.json:36 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissions"Bash(chmod +x bimplus-api-mcp/install.sh)",Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagescripts/build_mcpb.sh:25 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codeif ! command -v npx >/dev/null 2>&1; thenFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionscripts/sprint5_regression.py:3 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filestools added because swagger.json's POST/PUT /v2/{teamSlug}/projects/{projectId}/issues/{id}Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈3,481 tok
2 files · 57 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for ocp-mcp-server@0.2.0b13 as of 22 h ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.