Skills/PyPI/ocm-mcp-server

ocm-mcp-server@0.6.0

CAUTION· not started

Publisher claims: "A guardrailed MCP server that lets AI agents operate multi-cluster Kubernetes fleets through an Open Cluster Management hub" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher ocm-mcp-server · publishing for 110 daysInstalls 203Last detonated 23 h ago
What would fix thisWatchDispute verdict

Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
no credential variables read in the code
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso githubusercontent.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it under the guard. Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed. The code names no credential variable; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx ocm-mcp-server

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-13 and scored it 66/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Direct script execution from GitHub raw URL; Pipe-to-shell pattern; Collapsed <details> block carrying instructions. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.2sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.2sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedeval/run_eval.py:56 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run([str(REPO / "chaos" / "inject.sh"), "reset", cluster], check=False)Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
AST05
MEDIUM
References a credential file in the home directoryDockerfile:40 · References a credential file in the home directory# docker run -v ~/.kube/config:/kube/config:ro \Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST03
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedeval/run_eval.py:44 · Python subprocess execution detectedreturn subprocess.run(Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedeval/run_eval.py:51 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run([str(REPO / "chaos" / "inject.sh"), scenario, cluster], check=True)Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedhack/docs_stats.py:39 · Python subprocess execution detectedcollected = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedhack/bench_fleet.py:114 · Python subprocess execution detectedreturn subprocess.run(cmd, check=True, capture_output=True, text=True, **kw) # type: ignore[call-overload]Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedhack/e2e_tools.py:561 · Python subprocess execution detectedro = subprocess.run([sys.executable, "-c", code], capture_output=True, text=True,Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandhack/e2e_report.py:172 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes# a truncated final line from an interrupted run must not kill the reportFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedhack/bench_fleet.py:127 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Direct script execution from GitHub raw URLhack/e2e-local.sh:110 · Direct script execution from GitHub raw URL — unverified code source"https://raw.githubusercontent.com/open-cluster-management-io/clusteradm/${CLUSTERADM_VERSION}/install.sh"Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
Destructive file system command detectedDockerfile:49 · Destructive file system command detected&& rm -rf /usr/local/lib/python*/site-packages/pip* \Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
CRITICAL
Pipe-to-shell patternhack/bootstrap.sh:11 · Pipe-to-shell pattern — downloads and immediately executes remote code# curl -L https://raw.githubusercontent.com/open-cluster-management-io/clusteradm/main/install.sh | bashFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST06
MEDIUM
Destructive file system command detectedDockerfile:27 · Destructive file system command detected&& rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Remote installer piped to shellhack/bootstrap.sh:11 · Remote installer piped to shell# curl -L https://raw.githubusercontent.com/open-cluster-management-io/clusteradm/main/install.sh | bashFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST07
HIGH
Collapsed <details> block carrying instructionsREADME.md:127 · Collapsed <details> block carrying instructions<summary><b>VS Code</b> (Copilot Chat) - <code>.vscode/mcp.json</code> in your workspace</summary> ```json { "servers": { "ocm-fleet": { "type": "stdio", "commaFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathsDockerfile:40 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# docker run -v ~/.kube/config:/kube/config:ro \Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Direct script execution from GitHub raw URLhack/bootstrap.sh:11 · Direct script execution from GitHub raw URL — unverified code source# curl -L https://raw.githubusercontent.com/open-cluster-management-io/clusteradm/main/install.sh | bashFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
HIGH
Collapsed <details> block carrying instructionsREADME.md:347 · Collapsed <details> block carrying instructions<summary><b>observability</b> - why a cluster is unhealthy</summary> - **`get_cluster_health`** *(read)* - hub conditions, unhealthy pods, degraded deployments.Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedhack/e2e_tools.py:646 · Python subprocess execution detectedproc = subprocess.run([sys.executable, "-c", code], capture_output=True, text=True,Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedhack/e2e_tools.py:666 · Python subprocess execution detectedroot = subprocess.run(["git", "rev-parse", "--show-toplevel"],Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedhack/e2e_tools.py:668 · Python subprocess execution detectedinj = subprocess.run(["bash", f"{root}/chaos/inject.sh", "failing-rollout", cl],Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈68 tok
1 file · 81 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for ocm-mcp-server@0.6.0 as of 23 h ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.

What would make this Verified

14 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Pipe-to-shell pattern≈ +9 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  2. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim ocm-mcp-server: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  3. Hidden instructions≈ +6 on the totalRemove HTML comments, zero-width characters and white-on-white text that carry instructions. Everything the agent is meant to read should be visible to the person reading the file.
  4. Direct script execution from GitHub raw URL≈ +4 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
  5. Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalPut hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
  6. References a credential file in the home directory≈ +2 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
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