Skills/PyPI/obs-mcp

obs-mcp@0.2.0

VERIFIED· not started

Publisher claims: "MCP server for AI-driven OBS Studio control via obs-websocket v5 — scenes, sources, filters, audio mixer, streaming, recording, and studio mode." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher xdarkzx · publishing for 112 daysInstalls 332Last detonated 24 h ago
$claude mcp add obs-mcp -- uvx obs-mcp
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Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
install scripts, with decoy credentials in place · second launch with the clock 45 days ahead · the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
OBS_PASSWORDConfiguration, not credentials: OBS_HOST, OBS_PORT
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso githubusercontent.com, python.org — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names githubusercontent.com, python.org as well as its own vendor. The guard injects OBS_PASSWORD only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx obs-mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (3 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-13 and scored it 81/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 1 s · 3 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessinstall script run in the sandbox
0.2sprocessexec /usr/bin/uname
0.2sprocessexited 1:
0.3sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.3sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.3sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.4sprocesssecond launch, clock +45 days, CI unset
0.5sprocessexec /usr/bin/uname
0.5sprocessexited 1:

Static findings

HIGH
Direct script execution from GitHub raw URLinstall.sh:47 · Direct script execution from GitHub raw URL — unverified code sourceecho " /bin/bash -c \"\$(curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Homebrew/install/HEAD/install.sh)\""Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandinstall.sh:259 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionschmod 600 "$CONFIG_FILE"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandinstall.sh:318 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionschmod 600 "$LMSTUDIO_CONFIG_FILE"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandinstall.sh:54 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegessudo apt update && sudo apt install -y python3 python3-pipFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandinstall.sh:84 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegesecho " Ubuntu: sudo apt install python3 python3-pip"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandinstall.sh:60 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegessudo pacman -S --noconfirm python python-pipFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandinstall.sh:57 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegessudo dnf install -y python3 python3-pipFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈70 tok
1 file · 35 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for obs-mcp@0.2.0 as of 24 h ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.

obs-mcp@0.2.0 safety verdict: Verified (not started) — KillerSkills