Skills/PyPI/obris-mcp

obris-mcp@0.6.1

VERIFIED· not started

Publisher claims: "MCP server for Obris — bring your curated knowledge into any AI conversation" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server) · listed in the official MCP RegistryPublisher obris-dev · publishing for 269 daysInstalls 229Last detonated 25 h ago
$claude mcp add obris-mcp -- uvx obris-mcp
WatchReport an issue

Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
OAUTH_CLIENT_IDOAUTH_CLIENT_SECRETOAUTH_ISSUEROAUTH_SCOPESOBRIS_API_KEYOBRIS_MCP_PYPI_TOKENSENTRY_DSNConfiguration, not credentials: MCP_EXTRA_ALLOWED_HOSTS, MCP_HOST, MCP_PORT, MCP_RELOAD, MCP_SERVER_URL, OBRIS_API_URL
Where it talks to
obris.ai (its own)Also githubusercontent.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names githubusercontent.com as well as its own vendor. The guard injects OAUTH_CLIENT_ID, OAUTH_CLIENT_SECRET, OAUTH_ISSUER, OAUTH_SCOPES, OBRIS_API_KEY, OBRIS_MCP_PYPI_TOKEN, SENTRY_DSN only into requests to obris.ai (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --secrets OAUTH_CLIENT_ID=obris.ai,OAUTH_CLIENT_SECRET=obris.ai,OAUTH_ISSUER=obris.ai,OAUTH_SCOPES=obris.ai,OBRIS_API_KEY=obris.ai,OBRIS_MCP_PYPI_TOKEN=obris.ai,SENTRY_DSN=obris.ai -- uvx obris-mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-13 and scored it 89/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/publish.py:37 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, text=True, env=full_env)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)src/obris_mcp/remote/auth.py:59 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over networkmcp_server_url = os.environ.get("MCP_SERVER_URL", "https://mcp.obris.ai")Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)src/obris_mcp/remote/auth.py:280 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over networkmcp_server_url = os.environ.get("MCP_SERVER_URL", "https://mcp.obris.ai")Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/publish.py:74 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run(["uv", "build"], check=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/publish.py:73 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run(["rm", "-rf", "dist/"], check=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)src/obris_mcp/remote/server.py:20 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over networkmcp_server_url = os.environ.get("MCP_SERVER_URL", "https://mcp.obris.ai")Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)src/obris_mcp/remote/wellknown.py:53 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over networkmcp_server_url = os.environ.get("MCP_SERVER_URL", "https://mcp.obris.ai")Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈54 tok
1 file · 29 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for obris-mcp@0.6.1 as of 25 h ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.

obris-mcp@0.6.1 safety verdict: Verified (not started) — KillerSkills