Skills/PyPI/nyuwaymcpsandbox

nyuwaymcpsandbox@1.0.2

VERIFIED· not started

Publisher claims: "Open-source behavioral sandbox for Model Context Protocol (MCP) servers" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher nyuway-cybersecurity · publishing for 176 daysInstalls 0Last detonated 26 h ago
$claude mcp add nyuwaymcpsandbox -- uvx nyuwaymcpsandbox
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Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
no credential variables read in the code
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso nyuway-sandbox-probe.invalid, githubusercontent.com, nyuway.ai, nodejs.org — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it under the guard. Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed. The code names no credential variable; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx nyuwaymcpsandbox

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-13 and scored it 81/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.2sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.2sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsnyuwaymcpsandbox/cli/main.py:57 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"""Parse a minimal KEY=VALUE .env file.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_malicious_fixture.py:205 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesa targeted call to 'read_file' with '/etc/passwd' as the path argument,Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_malicious_fixture.py:16 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files'/etc/passwd' as the path argument. Asserts the sensitive_file_readFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandnyuwaymcpsandbox/pipeline.py:391 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsf" && chmod +x /tmp/chrome-wrapper && sleep infinity"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_malicious_fixture.py:127 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files{"name": "read_file", "arguments": {"path": "/etc/passwd"}},Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandnyuwaymcpsandbox/drivers/subprocess_stream.py:81 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes# Step 3: terminate, then escalate to kill if still alive.Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_sources.py:240 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesarchive.write_bytes(_build_zip_bytes({"../../etc/passwd": b"x"}))Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_malicious_fixture.py:210 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"""LLM that always calls read_file with /etc/passwd."""Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsnyuwaymcpsandbox/drivers/llm_driver.py:44 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# prompts like "read /etc/passwd" before any tool call fires, producingFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_sources.py:233 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesarchive.write_bytes(_build_zip_bytes({"/etc/passwd": b"x"}))Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectednyuwaymcpsandbox/pipeline.py:86 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_cli_smoke.py:348 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"""The .env parser handles the common shapes: KEY=value, quotes, comments."""Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_malicious_fixture.py:220 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesarguments={"path": "/etc/passwd"},Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_sources.py:199 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesinfo.linkname = "/etc/passwd"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsnyuwaymcpsandbox/cli/main.py:171 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system fileshelp="Path to a KEY=VALUE .env file whose entries are injected into the MCP "Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectednyuwaymcpsandbox/drivers/subprocess_stream.py:38 · Python subprocess execution detectedself._proc = subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈56 tok
1 file · 81 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for nyuwaymcpsandbox@1.0.2 as of 25 h ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.