Skills/PyPI/nouz-mcp

nouz-mcp@4.0.0

VERIFIED· not started

Publisher claims: "MCP server for Obsidian — semantic knowledge graph with auto-classification, DAG hierarchy, and cross-domain bridge detection" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher semiotronika · publishing for 221 daysInstalls 302Last detonated 28 h ago
$claude mcp add nouz-mcp -- uvx nouz-mcp
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Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
EMBED_API_KEYConfiguration, not credentials: EMBED_API_URL, EMBED_ENABLED, EMBED_MODEL, EMBED_PROVIDER, MODE, NOUZ_CACHE_WRITE, NOUZ_CONFIG, NOUZ_DATABASE_NAME, NOUZ_DATABASE_PATH, NOUZ_DB_NAME, NOUZ_DB_PATH, NOUZ_READ_ONLY, OBSIDIAN_ROOT, PROFILE
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the code
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard. It asks for EMBED_API_KEY and talks to its vendor. Give the credential to the guard, not the server: the value never enters the server's environment and only travels to the host you bind. What the tools do with a real credential was not observed.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx nouz-mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-13 and scored it 87/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
Unicode escape sequence detectednouz_mcp/signs.py:9 · Unicode escape sequence detected — may contain obfuscated payloads"concept": ("\u043f\u043e\u043d\u044f\u0442\u0438\u0435",),Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
AST07
MEDIUM
Unicode escape sequence detectednouz_mcp/signs.py:8 · Unicode escape sequence detected — may contain obfuscated payloads"note": ("\u0437\u0430\u043c\u0435\u0442\u043a\u0430",),Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
AST07
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedpytest_smoke.py:145 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run([sys.executable, "-c", script], check=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Unicode escape sequence detectedtest_server.py:135 · Unicode escape sequence detected — may contain obfuscated payloads"\u0437\u0430\u043c\u0435\u0442\u043a\u0430": "\u03b2",Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
AST07
MEDIUM
Unicode escape sequence detectednouz_mcp/signs.py:12 · Unicode escape sequence detected — may contain obfuscated payloads"update": ("\u043d\u043e\u0432\u043e\u0441\u0442\u044c", "\u043e\u0431\u043d\u043e\u0432\u043b\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0435"),Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
AST07
MEDIUM
Unicode escape sequence detectednouz_mcp/signs.py:10 · Unicode escape sequence detected — may contain obfuscated payloads"reference": ("\u0440\u0435\u0444\u0435\u0440\u0435\u043d\u0441", "\u0438\u0441\u0442\u043e\u0447\u043d\u0438\u043a"),Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
AST07
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedpytest_smoke.py:157 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run([sys.executable, "-c", script_with_cache], check=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Unicode escape sequence detectedtest_server.py:137 · Unicode escape sequence detected — may contain obfuscated payloads"\u0440\u0435\u0444\u0435\u0440\u0435\u043d\u0441": "\u03b6",Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
AST07
MEDIUM
Unicode escape sequence detectedtest_server.py:136 · Unicode escape sequence detected — may contain obfuscated payloads"\u043f\u043e\u043d\u044f\u0442\u0438\u0435": "\u03b4",Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
AST07
MEDIUM
Unicode escape sequence detectedtest_server.py:139 · Unicode escape sequence detected — may contain obfuscated payloads"\u043d\u043e\u0432\u043e\u0441\u0442\u044c": "\u03bc",Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
AST07
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstest_server.py:169 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesp2 = safe_path(root, "../../etc/passwd")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Unicode escape sequence detectedtest_server.py:140 · Unicode escape sequence detected — may contain obfuscated payloads"\u0433\u0438\u043f\u043e\u0442\u0435\u0437\u0430": "\u03bb",Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
AST07

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈66 tok
1 file · 45 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for nouz-mcp@4.0.0 as of 27 h ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.