notebooklm-mcp-server@0.1.15
VERIFIED· not startedPublisher claims: "MCP server for NotebookLM (notebooklm.google.com)" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.- Tested
- the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
NOTEBOOKLM_CSRF_TOKENor--show-tokensConfiguration, not credentials: NOTEBOOKLM_BL, NOTEBOOKLM_COOKIES, NOTEBOOKLM_MCP_DEBUG, NOTEBOOKLM_MCP_HOST, NOTEBOOKLM_MCP_PATH, NOTEBOOKLM_MCP_PORT, NOTEBOOKLM_MCP_STATELESS, NOTEBOOKLM_MCP_TRANSPORT, NOTEBOOKLM_QUERY_TIMEOUT, NOTEBOOKLM_SESSION_ID- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the codeAlso google.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names google.com as well as its own vendor. The guard injects NOTEBOOKLM_CSRF_TOKEN only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-13 and scored it 84/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
# Force kill if terminate didn't workFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.<summary>Alternative: Manual JSON Configuration</summary> Add to `~/.gemini/settings.json` under `mcpServers` (run `which notebooklm-mcp` to find your path): ``Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.process = subprocess.Popen(args, stdout=subprocess.PIPE, stderr=subprocess.PIPE)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for notebooklm-mcp-server@0.1.15 as of 26 h ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.