notebooklm-mcp-cli@0.16.5
VERIFIED· install onlyPublisher claims: "Unified CLI and MCP server for Google NotebookLM" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only.- Tested
- every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- use of the skill by an agent
What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
NLM_AUTH_STORAGEConfiguration, not credentials: ALLOW_REAL_KEYSTORE, NLM_BROWSER, NLM_BROWSER_PATH, NLM_NO_COLOR, NLM_OUTPUT_FORMAT, NLM_PROFILE, NOTEBOOKLM_ALLOWED_FILE_DIRS, NOTEBOOKLM_ASYNC_QUERY_MAX_INFLIGHT, NOTEBOOKLM_BASE_URL, NOTEBOOKLM_BL, NOTEBOOKLM_COOKIES, NOTEBOOKLM_DISABLE_HEADLESS_REFRESH, NOTEBOOKLM_HL, NOTEBOOKLM_KEYSTORE_SERVICE_NAME, NOTEBOOKLM_LOCATION, NOTEBOOKLM_MCP_CLI_PATH, NOTEBOOKLM_MCP_HOST, NOTEBOOKLM_MCP_PATH, NOTEBOOKLM_MCP_PORT, NOTEBOOKLM_MCP_TRANSPORT, NOTEBOOKLM_PROJECT_ID, NOTEBOOKLM_QUERY_TIMEOUT, NOTEBOOKLM_RPC_OVERRIDES, PYTEST_CURRENT_TEST- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the codeAlso google.com, youtube.com, example1.com, example2.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- use of the skill by an agent
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names google.com, youtube.com, example1.com, example2.com as well as its own vendor. The guard injects NLM_AUTH_STORAGE only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario; nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only) on 2026-11-14 and scored it 88/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
p2 = subprocess.Popen(Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.return subprocess.run([opener, "-R", str(path)], check=False, timeout=5).returncode == 0Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out."""Best effort to kill a process by PID."""Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.cdp_url: Full CDP HTTP URL (e.g., "http://172.20.112.1:9222")Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.# Each --slide value must be: '<slide-number> <instruction>'Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.p1 = subprocess.Popen(Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.return subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.Full CDP URL (e.g., "http://172.20.112.1:9222") or None.Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.process = subprocess.Popen(args, **kwargs)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.# Process alive but CDP dead — zombie, kill itFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.- Report: `.txt` or `.md` (Briefing Doc, Study Guide, Blog Post)Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.proc = subprocess.run(Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.
Known vulnerabilities
Not checked against OSV yet; the weekly check has not reached this version.