node804-panos-mcp@0.2.0
VERIFIED· not startedPublisher claims: "Token-efficient MCP server for Palo Alto Networks PAN-OS firewalls and Panorama" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.- Tested
- the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
PANOS_API_KEYPANOS_SETUP_API_KEYConfiguration, not credentials: PANOS_API_TIMEOUT, PANOS_ENABLE_RAW_CONFIG, PANOS_ENABLE_RAW_OPS, PANOS_FIREWALLS_CONFIG, PANOS_HOST, PANOS_PROFILE_FETCH_TIMEOUT, PANOS_RAW_XPATH_ALLOW, PANOS_READ_TIMEOUT- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the code
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard. It asks for PANOS_API_KEY, PANOS_SETUP_API_KEY and talks to its vendor. Give the credential to the guard, not the server: the value never enters the server's environment and only travels to the host you bind. What the tools do with a real credential was not observed.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-13 and scored it 87/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
…anges on the firewall | Changes are staged in candidate config | Call `commit` (admin mode). Use `get_pending_changes` / `get_config_diff` to review what's staged first. …Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.… same way Claude Desktop does. Open the app's **Connect to a custom MCP** form (Developer mode / custom connectors in settings) and fill it in: | Field | Value | |-------|--…Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.Always re-applies chmod after write because the ``mode`` argument toFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.| `set_config` / `run_op_command` not available in admin mode | Raw escape hatches are off by default | Set `PANOS_ENABLE_RAW_CONFIG=true` / `PANOS_ENABLE_RAW_OPS=true` *and* `PANOS_MODE=admin`. |Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct."/etc/passwd",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.… same way Claude Desktop does. Open the app's **Connect to a custom MCP** form (Developer mode / custom connectors in settings) and fill it in: | Field | Value | |-------|--…Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for node804-panos-mcp@0.2.0 as of 30 h ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.