Skills/PyPI/nginx-proxy-manager-mcp-server

nginx-proxy-manager-mcp-server@0.6.0

VERIFIED· not started

Publisher claims: "MCP server for Nginx Proxy Manager: proxy hosts, certificates, streams and access lists with dry-run previews" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher euisuh · publishing for 32 daysInstalls 490Last detonated 32 h ago
$claude mcp add nginx-proxy-manager-mcp-server -- uvx nginx-proxy-manager-mcp-server
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Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
MCP_BEARER_TOKENNPM_PASSWORDConfiguration, not credentials: MCP_HOST, MCP_PORT, MCP_TRANSPORT, NPM_EMAIL, NPM_READ_ONLY, NPM_URL
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the code
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard. It asks for MCP_BEARER_TOKEN, NPM_PASSWORD and talks to its vendor. Give the credential to the guard, not the server: the value never enters the server's environment and only travels to the host you bind. What the tools do with a real credential was not observed.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx nginx-proxy-manager-mcp-server

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-13 and scored it 85/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.2sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionnginx_proxy_manager_mcp/tools/payloads.py:7 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files# streams/streamID/put.json, access-lists/listID/put.json requestBody properties.Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
HIGH
Image alt text carrying instructionsREADME.md:19 · Image alt text carrying instructionsDry-run preview of creating an HTTPS proxy hostFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈73 tok
1 file · 41 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for nginx-proxy-manager-mcp-server@0.6.0 as of 30 h ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.