Is nextmcp@0.6.0 safe to install?

nextmcp@0.6.0

CAUTION· static only

Publisher claims: "Production-grade MCP server toolkit with minimal boilerplate" Observed in sandbox: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher keshavvarad · publishing for 376 daysInstalls 46Last detonated 32 h ago

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Coverage

Static only; nothing was run yet.

The label rests on the code, the instruction files and the publisher. The honeypot run replaces this verdict when it completes.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for: no credential variables read in the code
Where it talks to: no vendor host named in the codeAlso google.com, render.com, fly.io, prometheus.io — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw: nothing has run yet
What we could not test: everything: the server has not run yet

Run it before you trust it. Nothing has run yet: the code was read, the server was not. `vet-skills try` runs this exact version in the honeypot in about a minute.

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Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills analysed it statically (a sandbox run is pending) on 2026-11-13 and scored it 58/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Behavior trace

Queued for honeypot run · static analysis only

t+CategoryObserved action

This version has not been detonated yet. The score above counts behavior as unknown (50/100), so it cannot read Verified until the honeypot run completes and replaces this verdict.

Static findings

HIGH

Access to sensitive file pathsnextmcp/config.py:5 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files- .env filesFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.

AST05

HIGH

Access to sensitive file pathsnextmcp/security/validation.py:516 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files

description=f"Parameter '{param_name}' in tool '{tool.get('name')}' accepts file paths without validation. This is vulnerable to path traversal attacks (e.g., '../../../etc/passwd')",

Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.

AST05

MEDIUM

Python subprocess execution detectednextmcp/cli.py:445 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run(["railway", "up"], check=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.

AST05

MEDIUM

Python subprocess execution detectednextmcp/cli.py:420 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run(["docker", "compose", "up", "-d"], check=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.

AST05

HIGH

Access to sensitive file pathsnextmcp/config.py:50 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesenv_file: Path to .env file (default: .env)Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.

AST05

MEDIUM

Python subprocess execution detectednextmcp/cli.py:456 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(["which", "render"], capture_output=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.

AST05

MEDIUM

Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_deployment_templates.py:379 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# Create .env with PORTFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.

AST05

MEDIUM

Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_deployment_templates.py:380 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesPath(".env").write_text("PORT=9000\n")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.

AST05

MEDIUM

Python subprocess execution detectednextmcp/cli.py:416 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run(["docker", "compose", "build"], check=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.

AST05

HIGH

Access to sensitive file pathsnextmcp/config.py:42 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesenv_file: str | None = ".env",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.

AST05

MEDIUM

Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_deployment_templates.py:371 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"""Test port detection from .env file."""Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.

AST05

HIGH

Access to sensitive file pathsnextmcp/config.py:51 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesload_env: Whether to load .env file (default: True)Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.

AST05

HIGH

Access to sensitive file pathsnextmcp/deployment/templates.py:177 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesenv_file = Path(".env")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.

AST05

MEDIUM

File type combined with upload actiontests/test_deployment_templates.py:238 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesrenderer.render_to_file("test_template2.txt", output_path, context)Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.

AST07

HIGH

Access to sensitive file pathsnextmcp/deployment/templates.py:176 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# Check for .env file for port configurationFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.

AST05

MEDIUM

Python subprocess execution detectednextmcp/cli.py:433 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(["which", "railway"], capture_output=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.

AST05

MEDIUM

File type combined with upload actiontests/test_deployment_templates.py:216 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesrenderer.render_to_file("test_template.txt", output_path, context)Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.

AST07

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded

≈49 tok

1 file · 81 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for nextmcp@0.6.0 as of 30 h ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.

What would make this Verified

22 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%

Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim keshavvarad: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
File type combined with upload action≈ +2 on the totalRemove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.

Publish a new version to PyPI, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim keshavvarad Propose a patch to the maintainer