Skills/PyPI/networkx-mcp-server

networkx-mcp-server@2.0.0

VERIFIED· not started

Publisher claims: "NetworkX MCP Server with Security Fortress - Enterprise-grade secure graph analysis with AI-powered threat detection" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher bright-l01 · publishing for 487 daysInstalls 68Last detonated 32 h ago
$claude mcp add networkx-mcp-server -- uvx networkx-mcp-server
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Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
AUTH_TOKENENABLE_AUTHNETWORKX_MCP_SECURITY_API_KEY_ENABLEDNETWORKX_MCP_SECURITY_API_KEY_HEADERNETWORKX_MCP_SECURITY_JWT_SECRETNETWORKX_MCP_SECURITY_OAUTH_AUTH_URLNETWORKX_MCP_SECURITY_OAUTH_CLIENT_IDNETWORKX_MCP_SECURITY_OAUTH_CLIENT_SECRETNETWORKX_MCP_SECURITY_OAUTH_ENABLEDNETWORKX_MCP_SECURITY_OAUTH_TOKEN_URLConfiguration, not credentials: COMPRESSION_LEVEL, CONTAINER_MODE, ENVIRONMENT, HEALTH_CHECK_PORT, MAX_GRAPH_SIZE_MB, MAX_MEMORY_MB, METRICS_PORT, NETWORKX_MCP_SECURITY_JWT_ALGORITHM, NETWORKX_MCP_SECURITY_JWT_EXPIRY_HOURS, NETWORKX_MCP_SECURITY_RBAC_ENABLED, NODE_NAME, POD_NAME, REDIS_URL, SERVER_VERSION, STORAGE_BACKEND, USE_MINIMAL_SERVER
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the code
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard. It asks for AUTH_TOKEN, ENABLE_AUTH, NETWORKX_MCP_SECURITY_API_KEY_ENABLED, NETWORKX_MCP_SECURITY_API_KEY_HEADER, NETWORKX_MCP_SECURITY_JWT_SECRET, NETWORKX_MCP_SECURITY_OAUTH_AUTH_URL, NETWORKX_MCP_SECURITY_OAUTH_CLIENT_ID, NETWORKX_MCP_SECURITY_OAUTH_CLIENT_SECRET, NETWORKX_MCP_SECURITY_OAUTH_ENABLED, NETWORKX_MCP_SECURITY_OAUTH_TOKEN_URL and talks to its vendor. Give the credential to the guard, not the server: the value never enters the server's environment and only travels to the host you bind. What the tools do with a real credential was not observed.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx networkx-mcp-server

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-13 and scored it 83/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.2sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.2sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.2sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.2sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/networkx_mcp/enterprise/config.py:167 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesenv_file=".env",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/networkx_mcp/errors.py:416 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesvalidate_graph_id("../../../etc/passwd")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Destructive file system command detectedsrc/networkx_mcp/security_fortress/sandboxing.py:400 · Destructive file system command detected&& rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Auto-update or dynamic fetch configurationsrc/networkx_mcp/enterprise/config.py:163 · Auto-update or dynamic fetch configuration — agent may load new code at runtimehot_reload: bool = Field(default=False, description="Enable hot configuration reload")Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈69 tok
1 file · 81 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for networkx-mcp-server@2.0.0 as of 30 h ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.

networkx-mcp-server@2.0.0 safety verdict: Verified (not started) — KillerSkills