Skills/PyPI/netmcp

netmcp@0.4.0

VERIFIED· not started

Publisher claims: "Professional-grade network analysis MCP server with Wireshark, Nmap, and threat intelligence" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher cortexc0de · publishing for 225 daysInstalls 58Last detonated 32 h ago
$claude mcp add netmcp -- uvx netmcp
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Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
ABUSEIPDB_API_KEYConfiguration, not credentials: NETMCP_ALLOWED_CAPTURE_DIRS, NETMCP_OUTPUT_DIRS, NETMCP_TSHARK_PATH, NETMCP_WORKSPACE, SSLKEYLOGFILE
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso nmap.org, abuse.ch, abuseipdb.com, wireshark.org — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names nmap.org, abuse.ch, abuseipdb.com, wireshark.org as well as its own vendor. The guard injects ABUSEIPDB_API_KEY only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx netmcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-13 and scored it 80/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.2sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/netmcp/interfaces/tshark.py:434 · Python subprocess execution detectedlambda: subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, text=True, shell=False),Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandsrc/netmcp/interfaces/tshark.py:83 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privileges" Ubuntu/Debian: sudo apt install tshark\n"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandDockerfile:25 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissions&& mkdir -p /home/netmcp && chown netmcp:netmcp /home/netmcpFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandsrc/netmcp/interfaces/nmap.py:56 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privileges" Ubuntu/Debian: sudo apt install nmap\n"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/netmcp/resources/__init__.py:30 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/netmcp/interfaces/tshark.py:118 · Python subprocess execution detectedlambda: subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Destructive file system command detectedDockerfile:21 · Destructive file system command detected&& rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/* \Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Destructive file system command detectedDockerfile:28 · Destructive file system command detectedRUN pip install --no-cache-dir /tmp/*.whl && rm -f /tmp/*.whlFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_core/test_security.py:81 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"192.168.1.1; cat /etc/shadow",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Destructive file system command detectedtests/test_e2e.py:68 · Destructive file system command detectedsec.validate_target("; rm -rf /")Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_tools/test_advanced.py:108 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesfile_path="../../../etc/passwd",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Hex-encoded string detectedtests/test_interfaces/test_tshark.py:16 · Hex-encoded string detected — may contain obfuscated payloadsp.write_bytes(b"\xd4\xc3\xb2\xa1\x02\x00\x04\x00" + b"\x00" * 16)Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
AST07
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_core/test_security.py:205 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesvalidator.sanitize_filepath("../../../etc/passwd")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Destructive command against a filesystem root or devicetests/test_core/test_security.py:38 · Destructive command against a filesystem root or devicefor bad in ["eth0; rm -rf /", "eth0 | cat", "eth0 &", "eth0$", "eth0`whoami`"]:Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_e2e.py:71 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filessec.sanitize_filepath("../../../etc/passwd")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Destructive command against a filesystem root or devicetests/test_e2e.py:68 · Destructive command against a filesystem root or devicesec.validate_target("; rm -rf /")Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_tools/test_flow_tls.py:523 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system fileskeylog_file="../../etc/passwd",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_tools/test_pcap_tools.py:111 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesfilepath1="../../../etc/passwd",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Destructive command against a filesystem root or devicetests/test_core/test_security.py:77 · Destructive command against a filesystem root or device"; rm -rf /",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Destructive file system command detectedtests/test_core/test_security.py:38 · Destructive file system command detectedfor bad in ["eth0; rm -rf /", "eth0 | cat", "eth0 &", "eth0$", "eth0`whoami`"]:Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Destructive file system command detectedtests/test_core/test_security.py:143 · Destructive file system command detected"tcp; rm -rf /",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_core/test_security.py:79 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"| cat /etc/passwd",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
LOW
Authorization escalation languagedocs/ADD.md:265 · Authorization escalation language · informational: not an instruction file- Some scan types (SYN, OS detection) require root privilegesFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
MEDIUM
Destructive file system command detectedtests/test_core/test_security.py:77 · Destructive file system command detected"; rm -rf /",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Destructive command against a filesystem root or devicetests/test_core/test_security.py:143 · Destructive command against a filesystem root or device"tcp; rm -rf /",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈56 tok
1 file · 81 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for netmcp@0.4.0 as of 30 h ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.