Skills/PyPI/neo-cortex2-mcp

neo-cortex2-mcp@6.1.26

VERIFIED· not started

Publisher claims: "Neo Memory Cortex — Standalone Memory Server" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher pypi · publishing for 723 daysInstalls 143Last detonated 35 h ago
$claude mcp add neo-cortex2-mcp -- uvx neo-cortex2-mcp
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Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
ANTHROPIC_API_KEYCORTEX_EMBEDDING__API_KEYCORTEX_LLM__API_KEYGROQ_API_KEYJINA_API_KEYConfiguration, not credentials: CORTEX_DATA_DIR, CORTEX_LLM__PROVIDER, CORTEX_TIMELINE_FILE, CORTEX2_DASHBOARD_HOST, CORTEX2_DASHBOARD_PORT
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso groq.com, jina.ai, openrouter.ai, unpkg.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names groq.com, jina.ai, openrouter.ai, unpkg.com as well as its own vendor. The guard injects ANTHROPIC_API_KEY, CORTEX_EMBEDDING__API_KEY, CORTEX_LLM__API_KEY, GROQ_API_KEY, JINA_API_KEY only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx neo-cortex2-mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-13 and scored it 86/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/neo_cortex/core/setup.py:36 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesdot_env = dotcortex / ".env"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/neo_cortex/core/setup.py:42 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# The Docker .env must NOT carry a host SURREALDB_URL: inside theFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/neo_cortex/assets/docker-compose.yml:26 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesenv_file: .envFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/neo_cortex/core/setup.py:52 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesresult.created_files.append(".cortex/.env")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/neo_cortex/core/setup.py:125 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandsrc/neo_cortex/core/primitives/drill.py:166 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes# Downstream: this article's outgoing kill edges (what does it kill).Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈49 tok
1 file · 81 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for neo-cortex2-mcp@6.1.26 as of 33 h ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.