Skills/PyPI/nc-mcp-server

nc-mcp-server@0.9.0

VERIFIED· install only

Publisher claims: "MCP server for Nextcloud — expose Nextcloud APIs as AI-usable tools" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher alexander-piskun-bigcat88 · publishing for 235 daysInstalls 230Last detonated 35 h ago
$claude mcp add nc-mcp-server -- uvx nc-mcp-server
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Coverage

Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only.
Tested
every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
NEXTCLOUD_MCP_APP_PASSWORDNEXTCLOUD_PASSWORDConfiguration, not credentials: NEXTCLOUD_MCP_HOST, NEXTCLOUD_MCP_PERMISSIONS, NEXTCLOUD_MCP_PORT, NEXTCLOUD_MCP_RETRY_MAX, NEXTCLOUD_MCP_UPLOAD_ROOT, NEXTCLOUD_URL, NEXTCLOUD_USER
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso owncloud.org, calendarserver.org, nextcloud.org, apple.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
use of the skill by an agent

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names owncloud.org, calendarserver.org, nextcloud.org, apple.com as well as its own vendor. The guard injects NEXTCLOUD_MCP_APP_PASSWORD, NEXTCLOUD_PASSWORD only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx nc-mcp-server

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario; nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only) on 2026-11-13 and scored it 91/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
Dense URL-encoded contenttests/test_client_dav_paths.py:29 · Dense URL-encoded content — may be obfuscating payloads("Ünï 世界.txt", "%C3%9Cn%C3%AF%20%E4%B8%96%E7%95%8C.txt"),Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
AST07

No other findings across 18,904 lines in 73 files.

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈54 tok
1 file · 73 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for nc-mcp-server@0.9.0 as of 33 h ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.