Skills/PyPI/nanohub-mcp

nanohub-mcp@0.4.7

CAUTION· not started

Publisher claims: "MCP (Model Context Protocol) server library for nanoHUB tools" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher nanohub · publishing for 282 daysInstalls 2,068Last detonated 38 h ago
What would fix thisWatchDispute verdict

Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
install scripts, with decoy credentials in place · second launch with the clock 45 days ahead · the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
no credential variables read in the code
Where it talks to
nanohub.org (its own)
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it under the guard. Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed. The code names no credential variable and talks to nanohub.org, its own; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx nanohub-mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (3 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-13 and scored it 77/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths; Hidden zero-width characters detected. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 3 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.1sprocessexited 1: ModuleNotFoundError: No module named 'setuptools'
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.2sprocesssecond launch, clock +45 days, CI unset
0.2sprocessexited 1: ModuleNotFoundError: No module named 'setuptools'

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsnanohubmcp/skills.py:351 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# (`skill://demo/../../etc/passwd`) was already refused; this is the sameFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsnanohubmcp/skills.py:368 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# `.git/config` and `.env` in its manifest, readable by everyFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_examples.py:59 · Python subprocess execution detectedself.proc = subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Hidden zero-width characters detectednanohubmcp/skills.py:290 · Hidden zero-width characters detected — may conceal contentif text.startswith(""):Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST07
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)tests/test_spec_conformance.py:993 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over networkserver = MCPServer("guesses")Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectednanohubmcp/context.py:155 · Python subprocess execution detectedproc = subprocess.Popen(argv, start_new_session=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_cli.py:105 · Python subprocess execution detectedsite = subprocess.check_output([Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_skills.py:289 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files.git/config and .env to every connected client."""Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)tests/test_mcp_server.py:1097 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over networkfrom nanohubmcp.server import MCPServer, _SSEQueueFix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04
MEDIUM
Process kill commandnanohubmcp/tasks.py:712 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes# Outside the lock: callbacks kill process groups andFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectednanohubmcp/cli.py:521 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)tests/test_mcp_server.py:1990 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over networkfrom nanohubmcp.server import MCPServer, _SSEQueueFix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_skills.py:309 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files{"uri": "skill://git-workflow/.env"})Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)tests/test_mcp_server.py:1962 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over networkfrom nanohubmcp.server import MCPServer, _SSEQueueFix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)tests/test_mcp_server.py:1876 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over networkfrom nanohubmcp.server import MCPServer, _SSEQueueFix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)tests/test_mcp_server.py:2017 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over networkfrom nanohubmcp.server import MCPServer, _SSEQueueFix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_skills.py:292 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files".env": "TOKEN=secret\n"})Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandtests/test_examples.py:43 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes"""Spawn an example MCP server, capture its logs, kill it cleanly."""Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectednanohubmcp/cli.py:54 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈51 tok
1 file · 36 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for nanohub-mcp@0.4.7 as of 38 h ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.

What would make this Verified

3 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim nanohub: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  3. Hidden zero-width characters detected≈ +4 on the totalKeep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
  4. Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  5. MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)≈ +2 on the totalNamespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
  6. Process kill command≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
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