Skills/PyPI/nacos-mcp-router

nacos-mcp-router@0.2.2

VERIFIED· not started

Publisher claims: "Add your description here" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher pypi · publishing for 723 daysInstalls 142Last detonated 38 h ago
$claude mcp add nacos-mcp-router -- uvx nacos-mcp-router
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Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
ACCESS_KEY_IDACCESS_KEY_SECRETNACOS_PASSWORDConfiguration, not credentials: AUTO_REGISTER_TOOLS, DEBUG_MODE, MODE, NACOS_ADDR, NACOS_NAMESPACE, NACOS_SERVER_SCHEMA, NACOS_USERNAME, PROXIED_MCP_NAME, PROXIED_MCP_SERVER_CONFIG, TRANSPORT_TYPE, UPDATE_INTERVAL
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the code
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard. It asks for ACCESS_KEY_ID, ACCESS_KEY_SECRET, NACOS_PASSWORD and talks to its vendor. Give the credential to the guard, not the server: the value never enters the server's environment and only travels to the host you bind. What the tools do with a real credential was not observed.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx nacos-mcp-router

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-13 and scored it 87/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
Remote installer piped to shellDockerfile:5 · Remote installer piped to shellRUN curl -fsSL https://deb.nodesource.com/setup_22.x | bash -Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST07
MEDIUM
Destructive file system command detectedDockerfile:3 · Destructive file system command detectedRUN apt-get update && apt-get install -y build-essential curl && apt-get clean && rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Pipe-to-shell patternDockerfile:5 · Pipe-to-shell pattern — downloads and immediately executes remote codeRUN curl -fsSL https://deb.nodesource.com/setup_22.x | bash -Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST06
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)src/nacos_mcp_router/router_types.py:46 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over networkif 'protocol' in config['mcpServers'][name] and "mcp-sse" == config['mcpServers'][name]['protocol']:Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)src/nacos_mcp_router/router.py:103 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over networkmcp_server = await nacos_http_client.get_mcp_server(id="", name=proxied_mcp_name)Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)src/nacos_mcp_router/mcp_manager.py:102 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over networkmcpServers = await self.nacosHttpClient.get_mcp_servers()Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)src/nacos_mcp_router/mcp_manager.py:145 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over networkmcpServer = await self.nacosHttpClient.get_mcp_server(id='', name=self.proxy_mcp_name)Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈45 tok
1 file · 26 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for nacos-mcp-router@0.2.2 as of 38 h ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.