Skills/PyPI/n24q02m-mcp-core

n24q02m-mcp-core@1.25.11

CAUTION· not started

Publisher claims: "Unified MCP Streamable HTTP 2025-11-25 transport, OAuth 2.1 AS, lifecycle, install" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher n24q02m · publishing for 371 daysInstalls 9,794Last detonated 38 h ago
What would fix thisWatchDispute verdict

Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
CREDENTIAL_SECRETMCP_D1_TOKENMCP_JWT_SIGNING_SECRETMCP_KV_TOKENMCP_RELAY_PASSWORDMCP_VECTORIZE_TOKEN or --client-secretConfiguration, not credentials: LLM_API_BASE_ALLOW_PRIVATE, MCP_D1_BASE_URL, MCP_KV_BASE_URL, MCP_LOG_LEVEL, MCP_STORAGE_BACKEND, MCP_VECTORIZE_BASE_URL, MCP_VECTORIZE_IDX, PUBLIC_URL, USERNAME, VECTORIZE
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso jina.ai, microsoft.com, google.com, x.com, eff.org, cloudflare.com, d1.internal, vectorize.internal — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names jina.ai, microsoft.com, google.com, x.com, eff.org, cloudflare.com, d1.internal, vectorize.internal as well as its own vendor. The guard injects CREDENTIAL_SECRET, MCP_D1_TOKEN, MCP_JWT_SIGNING_SECRET, MCP_KV_TOKEN, MCP_RELAY_PASSWORD, MCP_VECTORIZE_TOKEN only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx n24q02m-mcp-core

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-13 and scored it 71/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Credential pass-through configuration; Prompting user to enter sensitive credentials; Credential pass-through configuration. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Credential pass-through configurationsrc/mcp_core/auth/credential_form.py:675 · Credential pass-through configuration — agent relays sensitive credentialsUsed by ``render_credential_form`` (relay credential form) and byFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST02
CRITICAL
Prompting user to enter sensitive credentialssrc/mcp_core/relay/tool_helpers.py:96 · Prompting user to enter sensitive credentials — social engineeringmessage = f"Open the {server_name} configuration page to enter your credentials securely in your browser."Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST03
HIGH
Credential pass-through configurationsrc/mcp_core/llm/vertex_express.py:260 · Credential pass-through configuration — agent relays sensitive credentialsraise VertexExpressError(f"vertex_express models require an API key (pass api_key= or set {_API_KEY_ENV})")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST02
CRITICAL
Prompting user to enter sensitive credentialssrc/mcp_core/auth/credential_form.py:1964 · Prompting user to enter sensitive credentials — social engineering<p class="form-title" id="form-title">Enter your credentials</p>Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST03
HIGH
Credential pass-through configurationsrc/mcp_core/auth/relay_login.py:159 · Credential pass-through configuration — agent relays sensitive credentialsThe visible card mirrors the relay credential form: dark theme, InterFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST02
HIGH
Credential pass-through configurationsrc/mcp_core/transport/local_server.py:598 · Credential pass-through configuration — agent relays sensitive credentials# Acquire lifecycle lock (stores pid, port, and proxy token)Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST02
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandsrc/mcp_core/oauth/jwt_issuer.py:104 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissions# would briefly be world-readable before the chmod below; the chmodFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandsrc/mcp_core/storage/session_lock.py:130 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissions# rather than chmod afterwards -- the relay URL in here is a capability,Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandsrc/mcp_core/storage/backends.py:112 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissions# Explicit mode at creation, not chmod afterwards: the temp file holdsFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/mcp_core/relay/browser.py:73 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/mcp_core/storage/machine_id.py:38 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/mcp_core/storage/machine_id.py:49 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandsrc/mcp_core/storage/backends.py:105 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissions# chmod still runs to fix an already-existing over-permissive dir (mkdirFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/mcp_core/relay/browser.py:54 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈60 tok
1 file · 81 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for n24q02m-mcp-core@1.25.11 as of 38 h ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.

What would make this Verified

9 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Prompting user to enter sensitive credentials≈ +9 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  2. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim n24q02m: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  3. Credential pass-through configuration≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  4. File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
  5. Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
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