Skills/PyPI/mycase-mcp

mycase-mcp@0.2.0

CAUTION· not started

Publisher claims: "MCP server for MyCase API — full coverage for law firm practice management" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher rosenadvertising · publishing for 190 daysInstalls 129Last detonated 39 h ago
What would fix thisWatchDispute verdict

Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
MYCASE_CLIENT_SECRETConfiguration, not credentials: MYCASE_CLIENT_ID
Where it talks to
mycase.com (its own)
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard. It asks for MYCASE_CLIENT_SECRET and talks to mycase.com. Give the credential to the guard, not the server: the value never enters the server's environment and only travels to the host you bind. What the tools do with a real credential was not observed.

$vet-skills run --secrets MYCASE_CLIENT_SECRET=mycase.com -- uvx mycase-mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-12 and scored it 75/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Text pushed off-screen by whitespace; Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Text pushed off-screen by whitespaceSPEC-DELTA-2026-07-28.md:30 · Text pushed off-screen by whitespace| **AFFECTS-US** | The stdio server must accept independent modern requests. Application state is already limited to downstream MyCase OAuth credentials and HTTFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
MEDIUM
Hex-encoded URLtests/test_public6_security.py:61 · Hex-encoded URL — attempt to bypass URL filtering"https://0x7f000001/",Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
AST07
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_cli_help.py:73 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run( # noqa: S603 - fixed Python command, isolated environmentFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsmycase_mcp/server.py:1446 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files- Resolution order: process env → `~/.mycase-mcp/.env` (chmod 0600 fallback).Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_public6_security.py:115 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesassert not (tmp_path / ".env").exists()Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
LOW
URL to a private-network addresstests/test_round2_destinations.py:275 · URL to a private-network address — a LAN or development target"https://172.16.0.1/",Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
LOW
URL to a private-network addresstests/test_public6_security.py:70 · URL to a private-network address — a LAN or development target"https://192.168.1.1/",Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known package.pre-commit-config.yaml:101 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codeentry: npx --no-install eslint --fixFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_tool_errors.py:577 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filestarget = config / ".env"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
HTTP URL with a raw public IP addresstests/test_public6_security.py:80 · HTTP URL with a raw public IP address — a hard-coded destination that domain-based monitoring cannot name"https://224.0.0.1/",Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_round2_destinations.py:90 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"file:///etc/passwd",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsmycase_mcp/credentials.py:11 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesStorage order (read): OS keyring -> process env -> ~/.mycase-mcp/.env fileFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_spec_2026_07_28.py:101 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_public6_security.py:58 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"file:///etc/passwd",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsmycase_mcp/setup/oauth_flow.py:7 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesback to a 0600 ``.env`` file when no keyring backend is available orFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsmycase_mcp/client.py:27 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# Resolve credentials through the pluggable store (OS keyring -> .env file).Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsmycase_mcp/credentials.py:82 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"""Parse the 0600 ``.env`` fallback file into a dict (empty if absent)."""Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_windows_secret_files.py:156 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filestarget = config / ".env"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
URL with embedded credentialstests/test_public6_security.py:76 · URL with embedded credentials — may be phishing or credential leaking"https://user:[email protected]/",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST07
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandmycase_mcp/server.py:1446 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissions- Resolution order: process env → `~/.mycase-mcp/.env` (chmod 0600 fallback).Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
LOW
URL to a private-network addresstests/test_public6_security.py:69 · URL to a private-network address — a LAN or development target"https://10.0.0.1/",Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
MEDIUM
URL using a raw public IP addresstests/test_public6_security.py:80 · URL using a raw public IP address — may bypass domain-based filtering"https://224.0.0.1/",Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
MEDIUM
HTTP URL with a raw public IP addresstests/test_public6_security.py:71 · HTTP URL with a raw public IP address — a hard-coded destination that domain-based monitoring cannot name"https://100.64.0.1/",Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsmycase_mcp/credentials.py:15 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesThe file fallback keeps the historical chmod-0600 ``.env`` behaviour so theFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
URL using a raw public IP addresstests/test_public6_security.py:71 · URL using a raw public IP address — may bypass domain-based filtering"https://100.64.0.1/",Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsmycase_mcp/credentials.py:36 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesENV_FILE = CONFIG_DIR / ".env"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
URL to the cloud instance metadata addresstests/test_public6_security.py:68 · URL to the cloud instance metadata address — reads the VM's credentials"https://169.254.169.254/",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST07
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsmycase_mcp/credentials.py:12 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesStorage order (write): OS keyring (falls back to the 0600 .env file only whenFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈54 tok
1 file · 37 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for mycase-mcp@0.2.0 as of 38 h ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.

What would make this Verified

5 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim rosenadvertising: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Hidden instructions≈ +6 on the totalRemove HTML comments, zero-width characters and white-on-white text that carry instructions. Everything the agent is meant to read should be visible to the person reading the file.
  3. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  4. Hex-encoded URL≈ +2 on the totalPut hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
  5. Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  6. npx invocation of non-well-known package≈ +2 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
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