multi-gw-mcp@1.0.2
VERIFIED· not startedPublisher claims: "Multi-account Google Workspace MCP server — Gmail, Drive, Sheets, Calendar" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.- Tested
- the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
GW_MCP_CLIENT_SECRETGW_MCP_OAUTH_PORTGW_MCP_WEB_CLIENT_SECRETConfiguration, not credentials: GW_MCP_ALLOWED_CLIENT_REDIRECTS, GW_MCP_CLIENT_ID, GW_MCP_CONFIG_DIR, GW_MCP_DOWNLOAD_DIR, GW_MCP_HOST, GW_MCP_PORT, GW_MCP_PUBLIC_URL, GW_MCP_TRANSPORT, GW_MCP_WEB_CLIENT_ID- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the codeAlso google.com, claude.ai — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names google.com, claude.ai as well as its own vendor. The guard injects GW_MCP_CLIENT_SECRET, GW_MCP_OAUTH_PORT, GW_MCP_WEB_CLIENT_SECRET only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-12 and scored it 85/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.chown -R appuser:appuser /dataFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.# (via a .env file or your orchestrator). All `:?` vars are required.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.chown -R appuser:appuser /home/appuser/.config && \Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.# Set via GitHub vars / docker-compose env / .env file.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for multi-gw-mcp@1.0.2 as of 40 h ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.