Skills/PyPI/multi-account-gmail-mcp

multi-account-gmail-mcp@0.7.0

VERIFIED· not started

Publisher claims: "Multi-account Gmail MCP server for AI agents" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher cunicopia-dev · publishing for 141 daysInstalls 211Last detonated 41 h ago
$claude mcp add multi-account-gmail-mcp -- uvx multi-account-gmail-mcp
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Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
GMAIL_MCP_CLIENT_SECRETGMAIL_MCP_OAUTH_PORTConfiguration, not credentials: GMAIL_MCP_ATTACHMENT_DIR, GMAIL_MCP_DB, GMAIL_MCP_MAX_ATTACHMENT_BYTES, GMAIL_MCP_MAX_BODY_CHARS
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso google.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names google.com as well as its own vendor. The guard injects GMAIL_MCP_CLIENT_SECRET, GMAIL_MCP_OAUTH_PORT only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx multi-account-gmail-mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-12 and scored it 85/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
Bidirectional text override characters detectedtests/test_gmail.py:611 · Bidirectional text override characters detected — may hide content directionout = sanitize_filename("photo‮gnp.exe", 5)Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
MEDIUM
Process kill commandsrc/gmail_mcp/auth.py:49 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes"""Best-effort: kill whatever is holding the OAuth loopback port.Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_gmail.py:594 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesout = sanitize_filename("../../../etc/passwd", 2)Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Bidirectional text override characters detectedtests/test_gmail.py:612 · Bidirectional text override characters detected — may hide content directionassert "‮" not in outFix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
MEDIUM
Process kill commandsrc/gmail_mcp/auth.py:101 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes# with EADDRINUSE. On collision we kill the squatter (always our own orphanedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/gmail_mcp/auth.py:63 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, timeout=5, check=False)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandsrc/gmail_mcp/auth.py:59 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes["sh", "-c", f"kill $(lsof -t -i:{port}) 2>/dev/null"],Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandsrc/gmail_mcp/gmail.py:189 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processesOrder matters: kill comment and non-content blocks first (OutlookFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈3,294 tok
2 files · 21 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for multi-account-gmail-mcp@0.7.0 as of 40 h ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.