Skills/PyPI/mt5-trading-mcp

mt5-trading-mcp@1.6.1

CAUTION· not started

Publisher claims: "MCP server for MetaTrader 5: let an AI agent read market data, watch trades, and place real trades - behind a consent/audit safety layer. Windows + Linux (Docker)." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher vincentwongso · publishing for 197 daysInstalls 208Last detonated 42 h ago
What would fix thisWatchDispute verdict

Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
MT5_PASSWORDConfiguration, not credentials: MT5_LOGIN, MT5_MCP_LOG_LEVEL, MT5_SERVER
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso winehq.org, python.org, mql5.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names winehq.org, python.org, mql5.com as well as its own vendor. The guard injects MT5_PASSWORD only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx mt5-trading-mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-12 and scored it 75/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Destructive file system command detected; Hidden zero-width characters detected. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsdocs/agents.md:14 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files`deploy/.env`, then `docker compose -f deploy/docker-compose.yml up -d`Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commanddeploy/Dockerfile:34 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsRUN chmod +x /Metatrader/start.shFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathsdeploy/docker-compose.yml:3 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# are (a) MT5 credentials (deploy/.env) and (b) a one-time terminal login viaFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Destructive file system command detecteddeploy/Dockerfile:23 · Destructive file system command detectedRUN rm -f /etc/apt/sources.list.d/winehq*.sources /etc/apt/sources.list.d/winehq*.list \Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Destructive file system command detecteddeploy/start.sh:83 · Destructive file system command detectedrm -f /config/.wine/drive_c/mt5setup.exeFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathsdeploy/docker-compose.yml:6 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# cp deploy/.env.example deploy/.env # fill in your broker credsFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Hidden zero-width characters detectedsrc/mt5_mcp/adapter/screenshot.py:137 · Hidden zero-width characters detected — may conceal contentstatus = done.read_text(encoding="utf-16-le").lstrip("").strip()Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST07
HIGH
Destructive file system command detecteddeploy/start.sh:71 · Destructive file system command detectedrm -f /config/.wine/drive_c/mono.msiFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Destructive file system command detecteddeploy/Dockerfile:27 · Destructive file system command detected&& rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Destructive file system command detecteddeploy/start.sh:104 · Destructive file system command detectedrm -f /tmp/python-installer.exeFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/mt5_mcp/server.py:144 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# so a half-filled .env (MT5_PASSWORD set, MT5_LOGIN missing) neitherFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈698 tok
2 files · 81 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for mt5-trading-mcp@1.6.1 as of 41 h ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.

What would make this Verified

5 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim vincentwongso: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  3. Hidden zero-width characters detected≈ +4 on the totalKeep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
  4. File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
  5. Destructive file system command detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
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