Skills/PyPI/msow-imsanghaar-mcp

msow-imsanghaar-mcp@1.2.0

VERIFIED· not started

Publisher claims: "MCP server for manipulating Microsoft Word documents" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher imamsanghaarc · publishing for 40 daysInstalls 178Last detonated 42 h ago
$claude mcp add msow-imsanghaar-mcp -- uvx msow-imsanghaar-mcp
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Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
SANGLABS_CREDENTIALS_PATHConfiguration, not credentials: MCP_HOST, MCP_PATH, MCP_PORT, MCP_RATE_LIMIT_BURST, MCP_RATE_LIMIT_ENABLED, MCP_RATE_LIMIT_RPS, MCP_SSE_PATH, MCP_TRANSPORT, SANGLABS_LOGIN_LINGER_SECONDS, SANGLABS_LOGIN_WAIT_SECONDS, SANGLABS_NO_BROWSER, SANGLABS_SITE_URL, SANGLABS_SUPABASE_ANON_KEY, SANGLABS_SUPABASE_URL
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso openxmlformats.org, supabase.co — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names openxmlformats.org, supabase.co as well as its own vendor. The guard injects SANGLABS_CREDENTIALS_PATH only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx msow-imsanghaar-mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-12 and scored it 81/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssetup_mcp.py:407 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesenv_example_path = os.path.join(base_path, '.env.example')Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsword_document_server/main.py:12 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# Load environment variables from .env fileFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssetup_mcp.py:406 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# Create .env.example fileFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Destructive file system command detectedDockerfile:12 · Destructive file system command detected&& rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsword_document_server/main.py:13 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesprint("Loading configuration from .env file...")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssetup_mcp.py:425 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesprint(f"Created .env.example at: {env_example_path}")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsetup_mcp.py:26 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsetup_mcp.py:149 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run([pip_path, 'install', 'fastmcp'], check=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsetup_mcp.py:131 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run([sys.executable, '-m', 'venv', venv_path], check=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedword_document_server/tools/extended_document_tools.py:132 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=60, check=False)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsetup_mcp.py:151 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run([pip_path, 'install', 'python-docx'], check=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsetup_mcp.py:156 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run([pip_path, 'install', '-r', requirements_path], check=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈53 tok
1 file · 49 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for msow-imsanghaar-mcp@1.2.0 as of 41 h ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.