Skills/PyPI/mseep-zulipchat-mcp

mseep-zulipchat-mcp@2.3.1

VERIFIED· not started

Publisher claims: "MCP server for Zulip Chat integration" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher akougkas · publishing for 485 daysInstalls 19Last detonated 42 h ago
$claude mcp add mseep-zulipchat-mcp -- uvx mseep-zulipchat-mcp
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Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
ZULIP_API_KEYZULIP_BOT_API_KEY or --zulip-api-key / --zulip-bot-api-keyConfiguration, not credentials: MCP_DEBUG, MCP_PORT, ZULIP_BOT_AVATAR_URL, ZULIP_BOT_EMAIL, ZULIP_BOT_NAME, ZULIP_EMAIL, ZULIP_SITE, ZULIPCHAT_DB_PATH
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso zulip.com, zulipchat.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names zulip.com, zulipchat.com as well as its own vendor. The guard injects ZULIP_API_KEY, ZULIP_BOT_API_KEY only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx mseep-zulipchat-mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-12 and scored it 83/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/zulipchat_mcp/core/agent_tracker.py:70 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/zulipchat_mcp/core/agent_tracker.py:81 · Python subprocess execution detectedbranch_result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/zulipchat_mcp/config.py:81 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"""Load configuration from CLI args with .env fallback."""Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/zulipchat_mcp/config.py:12 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# Load .env file from current working directoryFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/zulipchat_mcp/config.py:3 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesCLI arguments with .env fallback - matches context7 pattern.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Destructive file system command detectedtests/test_security.py:61 · Destructive file system command detecteddangerous = "`rm -rf /`"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/zulipchat_mcp/config.py:36 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"""CLI-based configuration with .env fallback for development."""Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/zulipchat_mcp/config.py:15 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# python-dotenv not available, skip loading .envFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈49 tok
1 file · 57 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for mseep-zulipchat-mcp@2.3.1 as of 42 h ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.