Skills/PyPI/mseep-zen-mcp-server

mseep-zen-mcp-server@5.11.1

CAUTION· not started

Publisher claims: "AI-powered MCP server with multiple model providers" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher mseep-support · publishing for 578 daysInstalls 14Last detonated 42 h ago
What would fix thisWatchDispute verdict

Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
CUSTOM_API_KEYDIAL_API_KEYGEMINI_API_KEYMAX_MCP_OUTPUT_TOKENSOPENAI_API_KEYOPENROUTER_API_KEYXAI_API_KEYConfiguration, not credentials: CUSTOM_API_URL, CUSTOM_MODEL_NAME, DEFAULT_MODEL, DEFAULT_THINKING_MODE_THINKDEEP, DIAL_API_HOST, DIAL_API_VERSION, DISABLED_TOOLS, LOCALE, VENV_PATH
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso dialx.ai, x.ai, pyenv.run, pypa.io, githubusercontent.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names dialx.ai, x.ai, pyenv.run, pypa.io, githubusercontent.com as well as its own vendor. The guard injects CUSTOM_API_KEY, DIAL_API_KEY, GEMINI_API_KEY, MAX_MCP_OUTPUT_TOKENS, OPENAI_API_KEY, OPENROUTER_API_KEY, XAI_API_KEY only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx mseep-zen-mcp-server

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-12 and scored it 70/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths; Direct script execution from GitHub raw URL. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
Destructive file system command detectedDockerfile:10 · Destructive file system command detected&& rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsrun-server.sh:1053 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesprint_error ".env.example not found!"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsCLAUDE.md:318 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files- Proper API keys configured in `.env` fileFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Direct script execution from GitHub raw URLtools/version.py:93 · Direct script execution from GitHub raw URL — unverified code sourcegithub_url = "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/BeehiveInnovations/zen-mcp-server/main/config.py"Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandrun-server.sh:426 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegesecho "sudo apt update && sudo apt install -y python3-venv python3-pip"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsserver.py:31 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# Try to load environment variables from .env file if dotenv is availableFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsCLAUDE.md:46 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files- Create/update .env fileFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsserver.py:39 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesenv_file = script_dir / ".env"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsutils/file_types.py:56 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files".env", # EnvironmentFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsserver.py:37 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# This ensures .env is loaded regardless of the current working directoryFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsrun-server.sh:1046 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesif [[ -f .env ]]; thenFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsrun-server.sh:1047 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesprint_success ".env file already exists"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
CRITICAL
Pipe-to-shell patternrun-server.sh:333 · Pipe-to-shell pattern — downloads and immediately executes remote codeecho " curl https://pyenv.run | bash" >&2Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST06
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandrun-server.sh:424 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegesecho "sudo apt update && (sudo apt install -y python${version_suffix}-venv python${version_suffix}-dev || sudo apt install -y python3-venv python3-pip)"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsserver.py:36 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# Load environment variables from .env file in the script's directoryFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsrun-server.sh:1052 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesif [[ ! -f .env.example ]]; thenFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsrun-server.sh:1044 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# Setup .env fileFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_utils.py:36 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filescontent, tokens = read_file_content("/etc/passwd")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandDockerfile:66 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsRUN mkdir -p tmp && chown -R zenuser:zenuser tmpFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
Destructive file system command detectedDockerfile:49 · Destructive file system command detected&& rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/* \Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionconfig.py:98 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files# - prompt.txt file content (alternative user input method)Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_utils.py:39 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesassert "--- END FILE: /etc/passwd ---" in contentFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandDockerfile:63 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsRUN mkdir -p logs && chown -R zenuser:zenuser logsFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandDockerfile:70 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsRUN chmod +x /usr/local/bin/healthcheck.pyFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandrun-server.sh:1628 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionschmod +x "$zen_wrapper"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_utils.py:38 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesassert "--- BEGIN FILE: /etc/passwd ---" in contentFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_utils.py:34 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# In the new security model, safe files like /etc/passwdFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Remote installer piped to shellrun-server.sh:333 · Remote installer piped to shellecho " curl https://pyenv.run | bash" >&2Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST07

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈2,842 tok
2 files · 81 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for mseep-zen-mcp-server@5.11.1 as of 41 h ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.

What would make this Verified

10 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Pipe-to-shell pattern≈ +9 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  2. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim mseep-support: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  3. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  4. Direct script execution from GitHub raw URL≈ +4 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
  5. Privileged sudo command≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  6. Destructive file system command detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
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